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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LESSONS
FROM RUSSIAN ENTERPRISE FIASCOES
MERRITI

B. Fox &

MICHAEL

A.

HELLER*

This Article draws on a rich array of deviant behavior in Russian enterprises to
craft lessons for corporate governance theory. First, Professors Fox and Heller define corporate governance by looking to the economic functions of the firm. Based
on this definition, they develop a typology that comprehensively shows all the channels through which bad corporate governance can inflict damage on a country's
real economy. Second, they explain the causes of Russian enterprise fiascoes by
looking to the particular initial conditions prevailing at privatization-untenable
firm boundaries and insider allocation of firm shares-and the bargaining dynamics that have followed. This focus offers a new perspective for a comparative corporate governance literature derived from United States, Western European, and
Japanese models. The analytic tools created in this Article can inform pressing
debates across contemporary corporate law, ranging from the theory of the close
corporation to the viability of "stakeholder" proposals.

INTRODUCTION

Russian industry has performed poorly since privatization. The
voluminous literature on transition economies explains this poor performance primarily in terms of continued bureaucratic meddling, poor
macroeconomic and tax policy, and low human capital; problems in
corporate governance often are mentioned as well but little analyzed. 1
* Louis & Myrtle Research Professor of Business and Law and Alene & Allen F.
Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan, and Professor of Law, University of Michigan, respectively. The authors are also the Research Directors for Corporate Governance
at the William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Business School. Thanks
to Gennady Danilenko, Jeffrey Gordon, Anne Meyendorff, Katharina Pistor, and to participants at Law and Economics Workshops at the University of California at Berkeley and
the University of Michigan, the Conference on Corporate Governance Lessons from 1\'ansition Economy Reforms co-sponsored by the William Davidson Institute and the University of Michigan Law School, the Fourth Annual International Conference on 1\'ansition
Economics in Beijing, China, and the American Law and Economics Association Annual
Meeting. Thanks also to Sean Grimsley, David Guenther, Catherine Jones, Mary Mitchell,
Anton Batirev, Matthew Roskowski, Christie Oberg, and Christopher Serkin for able research assistance. The William Davidson Institute and the Cook Endowment provided
generous research support.
t See, e.g., Organisation for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. (OECD), OECD Economic
Surveys 1997-1998: Russian Federation 129-35 (1997) (listing "[b]arriers to restructuring
and investment: corporate governance, capital markets, the tax system, and regional protectionism"); Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance:
What Went Wrong? 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1731 (2000) {offering comprehensive and thoughtful
account of Russian privatization failures); Anders Aslund, A Crisis of Confidence, Moscow
Times, June 3, 1998, at 8, 1998 WL 11690335 (noting that "the fundamental issue is ... not
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The goal of this Article is to open the black box of "poor corporate
governance" by detailing its consequences for the Russian economy
and by tracing its causes to the initial structure of Russian privatization. Understanding what went wrong in Russia teaches lessons not
only for transition policy in particular, but also for corporate governance theory in general.
After the fall of Russian Communism, state enterprises were
privatized rapidly, stock markets created, and a corporate legal code
adopted. However, even at its peak, before the 1998 collapse, the total stock market capitalization of Russia's 200 largest companies only
reached about $130 billion2-less than that of Intel Corporation. In
early 1999 the numbers were "phenomenally abysmal; if they could
sink any further, shares would literally have a value of zero. As it is,
the entire market is made up of penny stocks."3 These numbers represent a trivial fraction of the apparent value of the underlying corporate assets controlled by Russian corporations.4 The low prices
reflect severe corporate governance problems, including the high
probability that the firms' underlying assets will be mismanaged
grossly and that whatever cash flow is produced will be diverted to
benefit insiders or reinvested in unproductive projects.s In this Article, we extract lessons for corporate governance theory by focusing on
primarily macroeconomic. All along, Russia has suffered from serious problems in corporate governance.").
2 See Gary Peach, 1997 an Outstanding Year Despite Market Narrowness. Moscow
Tunes, Jan. 13, 1998, Lexis, World Library, Mostms file. This peak represented an
elevenfold improvement over 1994, when total stock market capitalization, based on
voucher auctions prices, was under $12 billion. See Ma.xim Boycko et al., Privatizing Russia 117 (1995). By the summer of 1998, "the Moscow T1D1es index of 50 leading shares hit
an all-time bottom, lower than its starting level four years ago." Katy Daigle, Bill Improves Shareholder Rights in Russia, Moscow TlDles, July 14, 1998, Lexis, World Library,
Mostms file; see also, e.g., Patricia Kranz, Fall of an Oligarch, Bus. Wk., Mar. l, 1999, at 44,
44 {"From its peak in October, 1997, the market capitalization of (these] three big industrial holdings-Sidanko Oil, Svyazinvest Telecommunications, and Norilsk Nickel-has
dropped from about $31 billion to $3.8 billion.").
3 Gary Peach, Poor Management Destroys Sberbank, Tatneft, MGTS, Moscow Tunes,
Dec. 15, 1998, at 14, 1998 WL 11691867.
4 Put another way, as measured by stock prices, a barrel of proven oil reserves owned
by a Russian oil company was worth about one-twentieth of a similar barrel O\med by a
Western oil company. See Boycko et al., supra note 2, at 120; Das Kapital Revisited, Economist, Apr. 8, 1995, Survey, at 15, 16 ("[A] barrel of oil in the ground owned by a Russian
company is worth 10 cents. A barrel owned by a western company is worth $550."). This
disparity is striking because oil is a quintessential ex"Port product \\ith a uniform and wellrecognized global value. Of course, poor corporate governance is just one important factor
in the low stock price equation; other factors include political instability and expropriation
risk.

s See Floyd Norris, The Russian Way of Corporate Governance, N.Y. Tunes, Apr. 5,
1999, at A20 (noting that Russia's second largest oil company stock value declined 98%
due in part to poor corporate governance).
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two questions: What are the consequences of these corporate governance problems for the real economy in Russia? Why have these
problems become so widespread and persistent?
To answer the first question, we define corporate governance in a
way that looks to the economic functions of the firm rather than to
any particular set of national corporate laws. Firms exhibit good corporate governance when they both maximize the firm's residuals 6the wealth generated by real operations of the firm-and, in the case
of investor-owned firms, distribute the wealth so generated to shareholders in a pro rata fashion. Bad corporate governance is just the
failure of a firm to meet one or both of these conditions. Whether
managers operate their firms in ways that meet these conditions depends on the structure of constraints and incentives in which they operate, a structure that depends in part, but only in part, on the
prevailing legal system. In this Article, we give more precision to the
idea of "bad" corporate governance by developing a novel typology of
the kinds of damage to the real economy that loosely constrained and
poorly incentivized managers can inflict. By canvassing a rich array of
deviant behavior, we identify why this damage has been particularly
severe in Russia.
As for the second question, we go beyond standard causal explanations of poor corporate governance, such as the low level of corporate transparency, the lack of effective adjudication of corporate law
violations, the weak enforcement of judgments, and the absence of a
network of trust among Russian businesses, factors that are common
to all post-socialist corporate economies. We expand this inquiry by
introducing the role of initial conditions-specifically, the initial
boundaries of privatized firms and the initial allocation of firm shares
to insiders-and the bargaining dynamics that have followed from
these conditions. Our new perspective identifies previously overlooked factors that help explain why Russian corporate performance
remains so much worse than that of other transition countries.
Our analysis is not confined to the Russian experience alone;
rather, it provokes rethinking of corporate governance theory more
generally. Though our typology emerges from studying Russian corporate fiascoes, it has global applicability; for the first time and in a
comprehensive way, we link poor corporate governance to real economy effects. We create an analytic tool that identifies the complete
set of vulnerabilities to corporate governance problems that may arise
6 A firm's residuals are defined as the difference between what a firm pays at contractually pre-determined prices for its inputs and what it receives for its outputs. See infra
Part I.A for a more precise statement of this definition.
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in any economy and that helps to generate more tailored policy responses than previously possible. Our work on initial conditions also
has more general applicability. The existing scholarly literature on
comparative corporate governance reflects the range of firm boundaries and dominant share ownership patterns in the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan. The Russian e,.,,-perience falls, at least initially, outside this range and teaches provocative new lessons about
the roles that firm boundaries and ownership structure may play in
corporate governance theory, lessons that may benefit Russia, other
countries in transition, and even the United States.
Part I defines bad corporate governance and, using Russian examples, develops a typology of its consequences for the real economy.
.Part II describes the initial conditions of Russian privatization and
shows how they continue to cause corporate governance failures. The
Article concludes by suggesting how the analytic tools we create here
may inform pressing debates in contemporary corporate law.
I

A

TYPOLOGY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FAILURES

A. A Simple Definition
Commentators on transition economies invariably discuss the
consequences of "poor corporate governance" but without specifying
what that means. What little commentary does exist tends to focus on
some idealized set of corporate law rules.7 In contrast, we measure
the quality of corporate governance in terms of the social welfare impact of firm decisionmaking. We make no prejudgments about which
institutional arrangements work best in any particular country. Under
our definition, good corporate governance requires two things: (1)
Managers must maximize their firm's residuals, and (2) firms, at least
investor-owned firms, must distribute those residuals on a pro rata basis to shareholders. Let us consider each element in tum.
The first key feature of a well-governed firm is that its managers
make decisions that seek to maximize the residuals that the firm generates over time, discounted to present value. Residuals are defined
as the difference between what a firm pays at contractually predetermined prices to obtain its inputs and what it receives for its output.8
1 See, e.g., OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) (outlining prin·
ciples of corporate governance recommended for OECD countries).
s Note that cost of inputs includes expenditures for real investment. Thus, in any given
period, a firm's cash flow from operations-its cost of inputs other than real investment
minus its revenues from sale of output-either can be distributed to the firm's residual
claimants during that period, in which case they become residuals in that period, or can be
expended to purchase real investment assets. The rationale for such reinvestment is to
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We define this criterion in terms of residual maximization rather than
share value maximization to avoid foreclosing the possibility that labor- or consumer-owned firms may be optimal in certain situations,9
In an ordinary investor-owned corporation, however, the residuals go
to shareholders who provide the firm's equity-based capital, which is
the only input not obtained at contractually predetermined prices.
Thus, for such a firm, maximizing share value is equivalent to maximizing residuals .10
The conclusion that it is socially desirable for a firm to maximize
its residuals flows from two assumptions, both of which are standard
in simple models of the corporation: (1) that the firm purchases its
inputs and sells its outputs in competitive markets, and (2) that there
are no important externalities or subsidies. Thus, the contractually
predetermined prices the firm pays for its inputs (other than its equity-based capital) are equal to the value of what the firm takes from
society; similarly, the firm's selling prices for its output equals the
value of what it gives to society. Maximizing the difference in value
between inputs and outputs maximizes the firm's contribution to society and hence constitutes efficient behavior. 11
In the case of an ordinary investor-owned firm, the second feature of good governance is that the residuals are distributed to shareholders and in a pro rata fashion. 12 Meeting this second condition is
not strictly necessary for one-period, static efficiency. For a single period, all that is necessary is that the residuals be maximized, regardless
create a larger firm cash flow in some subsequent period that then would be available for
distribution as residuals to residual claimants.
9 See generally Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (1996) (discussing circumstances in which labor-owned, customer-owned, and other types of firms may succeed).
10 See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 Yale L.J. 1197, 1198-1200 (1984)
(discussing problems created by multiple classes of corporate constituencies).
11 We make the standard assumptions that the firm purchases its inputs and sells its
outputs in competitive markets and that there are no important externalities or subsidies,
but not because we believe they are consistently true in Russia or any other countryclearly they are not. Instead, we make these assumptions because they allow us to focus on
the social welfare effects of activities that take place within the firm in reaction to the
constraints imposed directly by the legal system and by the firm's markets for inputs, outputs, and capital. Such a focus allows us to separate out more precisely the different
problems in the Russian economy. Thus, these assumptions allow for more precise policy
analysis. Their standard nature also makes it easier to draw larger corporate governance
lessons from the Russian experience because most analyses of corporate governance
problems in other countries make the same assumptions.
12 See Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 5, 63
(6th ed. 2000). Fast-growing firms, such as Microsoft, frequently reinvest all operational
cash flow rather than pay dividends. Nevertheless, the only reason to hold shares in such a
company is the prospect that, at some point, it will make pro rata dividends or other distributions to its shareholders. See supra note 8 (discussing reinvestment of cash flows from
operations).
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of who receives them. The pro rata distribution condition is helpful,
however, in achieving the efficient allocation of resources over time
because pro rata distribution greatly increases the ability of firms to
raise capital by issuing new equity.
For a firm to raise capital by selling equity at a price worthwhile
to its owners, a firm needs credibly to promise to abide by both principles of good corporate governance-striving to maximize its future
residuals and guaranteeing shareholders some determinable proportion of these residuals as dividends or other distributions. The e;...-pectation of eventually receiving such distributions is what makes holding
a share worthwhile as a financial instrument and what induces outsiders to provide cash in return for shares. A firm gains credibility in
several ways: by developing a record of abiding by its promises, by
being subject to a binding legal system, and by structuring incentives
so that managers gain if they fulfill their promises and suffer if they do
not. If a firm acts contrary to its promises, it undermines its own record and becomes less able to acquire new equity financing.13 Note,
also, that when a legal system fails to punish such a firm, an individual
firm's decision to break its promises imposes externalities: Investors
become generally less 'villing to buy equity of other firms governed by
the same legal system. In other words, weak corporate governance in
existing firms poisons the well for new firms that hope to use equity
markets.14
Defective corporate governance means that a firm does not meet
one or both elements of our definition. Most attention in reports on
transition economies has focused on problems relating to non pro rata
distributions: for example, when insiders dilute shares of outsiders,
loot companies, fail to pay dividends, or engage in other tactics that
deprive outside shareholders of their pro rata share of the wealth generated by the firm. 15 Non pro rata distributions indeed do help explain low stock prices and the poor performance of the corporate
sector. But failure to maximize residuals has the same effect, indeed
even more directly. The vast transition economy literature never
makes clear which failure dominates in any particular enterprise fiasco. Instead, bad corporate governance becomes a catch-all e;...-plana13 See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming 2000).
14 See id.; see also Andrew Jack, Pouring Oil on Troubled Waters, Fm. TlDles (London),
Jan. 19, 2000, at 21 (noting that, because of poor corporate governance, "[f]oreigners were
also far less keen on the Russian stock market last year•••• [T]here was a net outflow of
$400 m[illion] in portfolio investment during the first nine months of 1999, compared \\ith
an inflow of $8 b[illio]n for all of 1998.").
15 See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 1, at 1765 (focusing on self-dealing explanations for
poor Russian corporate performance).
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tion for problems that should be understood as being quite distinct. 16
Pinning down and separating out these distinctions should prove helpful when it comes time to prescribe policy cures.
A cautionary methodological note is in order at the outset, however. The study of corporate governance in Russia is hampered by
two problems. First, serious firm-level econometric study of corporate
governance changes in Russia is difficult, if not impossible, because
meaningful hard data on enterprise behavior are hard to come by.
Firms do not publish credible accounts of their own performance because managers hide their ongoing thefts of firm assets from outside
shareholders and from others who would likewise seek to steal those
assets themselves, including labor and the mafia.17 Back tax debts,
which pervade the corporate sector, mean that any reported income
may be seized, making the effective tax rate one hundred percent. 18
Thus, most income statements and balance sheets are fictional. Second, econometric work testing propositions about corporate governance based on country-level comparisons of economic performance is
similarly difficult. Good corporate governance is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for achieving a developed capitalist economy-it simply helps. Italy, for example, has a vibrant economy even
though the governance of its corporations generally would fall far
short of the standards set out here. 19 Russia, in contrast, likely would
continue to languish economically absent a solution for some of its
other pressing problems even if its firms all fully met these standards.
The sample size of countries is small relative to all the other factors
that affect national economic performance.
These two problems mean that we are left with anecdotal accounts and surveys as our main sources of empirical information.
16 The mixed corporate governance problems may be difficult to tease apart. For ex·
ample, one commentator notes that "problems range from murder to bad market trends,
but all boil down to basic corporate governance: Directors and their cohorts appear to
have milked or outright plundered the companies to the detriment of any outside shareholders, real or potential." Mark Whitehouse, The Other Side of the Boom, Moscow
Times, Sept. 16, 1997, Lexis, World Library, Mostms file. When insiders gut a firm, they
could be failing to maximize residuals according to several of the pathologies we identify as
well as making non pro rata distributions.
17 See World Bank, World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market 55 (1996);
Dmitru Vasilyev, Remarks at the Luncheon of the American Chamber of Commerce in
Russia (Dec. 4, 1998), in Lexis, News Library, Sovnws file (stating that "[a]t present ... the
board of directors and the excessive power of the director make theft of company assets
possible").
18 See Anna Meyendorff, Barter in Russia 17 (Dec. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the New York University Law Review).
19 See Luigi Zingales, The Value of a Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience, 7 Rev. Fin. Stud. 125, 146 (1994) (suggesting that huge control premium for shares of Italian firms shows poor corporate governance regime).
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These sources involve their own biases; nevertheless, they present a
reasonably coherent picture of the landscape of corporate governance
failures. Imposing a theoretical framework on this picture yields a
plausible and informative account of the relationship between corporate governance and national economic performance.
B.

The Failure to Maximize Residuals

In this Section, we identify five distinct pathologies that loosely
constrained and poorly incentivized managers may inflict on firms and
that may result in the firms' failure to maximize residuals.20 \Ve focus
first on this prong of bad corporate governance because it is crucial to
explaining why insiders sometimes do not operate their firm even to
maximize their own joint benefit, a puzzle we take up in Part II.B. As
we shall see, the initial structure of ownership makes Russian firms
particularly vulnerable to these five corporate governance pathologies. When the initial ownership structures intersect with untenable
firm boundaries, the pathologies we identify here become self-reinforcing and even more intractable.

1. Pathology 1: Continued Operation of Value-Destroying Firms
Any economy has some unreformable value-destroying firms that
should be shut down immediately.21 Continued operation of these
firms, even if undertaken as efficiently as possible, represents a negative net present value decision from a social point of view: The cost of
operation in the current period results in a social loss too great to be
offset by social gains, if any, from continued operation in subsequent
periods.22 Despite the social harm, institutional arrangements in an
economy nevertheless may permit such a firm to continue operating.
20 Note that we continue to assume that the firm purchases its inputs and sells its outputs in competitive markets and that there are no important externalities or subsidies.
Therefore, the firm's input costs should reflect the social opportunity costs of continued
operation and its output prices should reflect the social benefits of production.
21 For some American examples, see James Surowiecki, Why Won't Anyone Pull the
Plug on UPN?, New Yorker, Apr. 3, 2000, at 32, 32 (puzzling over question why "companies and divisions are kept afloat long after they've stopped creating \'alue and started
destroying it. Plenty of businesses exist only-well, because they exist.").
22 More precisely, for a firm to fall into this category, two requirements must be met.
First, the social benefit from the firm's output in the current period must be less than the
social cost of its inputs. Second, after comparing the social benefits and costs for each
subsequent period, and discounting the difference to present value, the aggregate of these
discounted differences must be either negative or, if positive, less than the deficit in the
current period. In terms of current operations, this assumes that the firm operates at lowest possible cost for the level of output chosen and that it chooses the le\·el of output that
will maximize its cash flow from operations. In terms of decisions made in the current
period that affect future periods, this assumes that the firm follows an optimal in\·estment
policy, which commonly would mean undertaking no investment at all.
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For example, in Russia the Tutayev Engine Factory continues to operate despite the plant manager's estimate that "it costs the plant about
1.33 rubles to produce about 1 ruble in output." 23 In the case of many
unreformable value-destroying firms, poor corporate governance is
the main cause of their continued operation, and hence the reason for
identifying this problem as the first type of potential corporate governance pathology. Frrm managers wish to continue operations in order to hold onto their jobs and the associated perquisites.24 Because
they are not constrained by effective corporate governance mechanisms, the managers get their way. In other cases, however, good corporate governance is not necessary to shut down a firm that in fact
should be closed. And in yet other cases, good corporate governance
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to close the firm. Making
these distinctions is important for identifying effective policy
responses.

a. When Is Corporate Governance Relevant? Retain the assumption for a moment that an unreformable value-destroying firm
purchases inputs and sells outputs in competitive markets, that there
are no important externalities, and that credit and other finance is extended to firms only on a reasonably informed, rational basis. Even
with no new investment, such a firm's ordinary operations result in a
negative cash flow in the current period (one that is sufficiently negative that expected future cash flow, discounted to present value,
would, even if positive, be unable to offset it). Tue firm thus would
lack enough current cash flow to purchase the inputs it needs to
continue production and would lack cash flows in the future to use as
a basis to obtain credit or other finance sufficient to cover this deficit.
The importance of corporate governance here depends entirely
on whether the firm has any cash reserves or assets with significant
salvage value. Without reserves or salvageable assets, the firm would
23

Maura Reynolds, A Russian Company Town's Miracle, L.A. Times, Mar. 5, 1999, at

AL
24 See European Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., Transition Report 1998, at 32 (1998)
(noting lack of effective checks on insider managers in transition economies); id. at 142
{describing conflict of interest between "private objectives of managers" and investors in
bank privatizations); Roman Frydman et al., Investing in Insider-Dominated Firms: A
Study of Russian Voucher Privatization Funds, in 1 Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia 187, 219-20 (Roman Frydman et al. eds., 1996); Cheryl W. Gray &
Kathryn Hendley, Developing Commercial Law in Transitional Economies: Examples
from Hungary and Russia, in The Rule of Law and Economic Reform in Russia 139, 154
(Jeffrey D. Sachs & Katharina Pistor eds., 1997); Meyendorff, supra note 18, at 15. For an
analysis of the same phenomenon in the American context, see Surowiecki, supra note 21,
at 32 (noting that "[t]he value that the [firm] is destroying can seem distant; the rewards it
brings to those on [the] payroll are immediate").
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be forced to close immediately, regardless of how much its managers
wanted to continue operations, and regardless of how ineffective existing corporate governance mechanisms were in restraining them.
Russia's generally outmoded factories suggest that many firms lack
assets with any significant salvage value.25 There is also a general cash
shortage.26 Thus, absent subsidies and problems in the way credit is
extended, many firms whose continued operation is value destroying
would shut down promptly even though the corporate governance regime is highly ineffective. Neither improved corporate governance
nor an effective bankruptcy regime is necessary to eliminate such
firms.21
On the other hand, for firms with reserves or salvageable assets,
effective corporate governance is necessary to shut down the firm immediately. Otherwise, managers can indulge their desires to continue
operation. Where cash reserves are available, the cash can be used
directly to buy the needed inputs. Where the firm has salvageable
assets, cash can be raised by selling the assets or using them as a basis
for gaining credit. Many value-destroying Russian firms do have assets with significant salvage value.28 Manufacturing businesses, for example, often are located inside large cities on real estate with far more
value in other uses. If the firm has a negative cash fl.ow, its managers
nevertheless may be able to keep operating by cashing out the salvage
value of these assets to acquire needed inputs. Even with a positive
cash fl.ow, closing the firm may be socially desirable once the rental
value of the land is counted properly as an opportunity cost.2 9

b. The Role of Subsidies and Inappropriate Credit and Finance. Now, drop the assumptions made above concerning subsidies, credit, and finance. Where there is a subsidy, or credit or finance
is extended on other than a reasonably informed and rational basis, a
firm can have a positive cash fl.ow even though the social benefit from
the firm's output might be less than the social cost of its inputs. Under
25 See Maura Reynolds, Yeltsin Legacy Impressive but Clouded, LA. Times, Jan. l,
2000, at Al (stating that "shareholders have no guarantee that their stock certificates have
real value").
26 See Meyendorff, supra note 18, at 16.
27 See World Bank, supra note 17, at 45 (noting that government policies such as
macroeconomic stabilization and credible commitment to reform play largest role in
whether enterprises in transition economies actually adjust).
28 See European Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., supra note 24, at 33 (describing how
loss-making Russian firms use various devices to solve cash flow problems); World Bank,
supra note 17, at 55 (describing how Russian corporate insiders divert assets to other firms
they also control).
29 See Brealey & Myers, supra note 12, at 123 (describing alternate use of land as opportunity cost).
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such circumstances, the firm's continued operation, even though involving a social .loss, can be perfectly consistent with maximizing
residuals. Corporate governance mechanisms that push a firm's managers to maximize residuals will not lead by themselves to the socially
desirable result of closing down these firms. Indeed, for firms without
reserves or salvageable assets, the quality of corporate governance is
not even relevant. Such firms will be shut down, regardless of the
quality of corporate governance, only if the subsidies or inappropriate
credit provision is ended.30
Russia continues to provide many subsidies, particularly in the
energy area. 31 The system by which input suppliers are paid, often
involving barter, is highly chaotic, implying that credit is not extended
in a rational, well-informed fashion. 32 Workers often become involuntary creditors when firms do not pay them.33 All this suggests that,
while many Russian firms that are continuing to operate should be
shut down immediately, improved corporate governance will not, or
will not by itself, solve the problem. Instead, elimination of subsidies
and improvement of the credit process are necessary reforms.
In sum, Russian firms that should be shut down immediately fall
into three groups. The first consists of firms with no cash reserves or
assets with significant salvage value that do not benefit from subsidies
or unsuitable credit extensions. These firms are presumably closing
on their own, no matter how bad their corporate governance mecha30 See European Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., supra note 24, at 33 (showing how
subsidies and credit extension support failing Russian firms); World Bank, supra note 17, at
45.
31 See World Bank, supra note 17, at 45 (noting drop in direct subsidies but significant
increase in tax arrears and ad hoc tax exemptions); IEA Urges the Elimination of Subsidies in Developing Nations, Petroleum Economist, Dec. 1999, at 59, 59 (noting that sizable
subsidies remain in Russia's energy sector); Coal Sector to Develop Without State Subsidies, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 11, 2000, Lexis, News Library, Non-US file
(relaying !TAR-TASS report of February 1, 2000, that Ministry of Fuel and Energy set goal
of subsidy-free energy industry for 2000).
32 See Clifford Gaddy & Barry W. Ickes, To Restructure or Not to Restructure: Informal Activities and Enterprise Behavior in Transition 6-7 (William Davidson Inst. Working
Paper No. 134, 1998), available at <http://eres.bus.umich.edu/docs/workpap-dav/
wp134.pdf> (discussing causes of pervasive barter in Russian economy); Meyendorff, supra
note 18, at 3 (indicating that Russian firms increasingly are using barter trade, which is
inefficient means of transacting business).
33 For purposes of this analysis, workers can be considered involuntary creditors, but
only for the wage arrears that have accumulated during the period before sporadic wage
payment became their firm's ordinary and usual behavior. Once the pattern of sporadic
payment becomes expected and there is no reasonable prospect that the arrears arc going
to be paid, the practice is more appropriately viewed as a de facto wage reduction. At that
point, the decision of workers to stay in the firm's employment suggests that the alternatives available to them were no more desirable. Thus, the de facto lower level of wages is
presumably a reasonable measure of the social opportunity cost of their labor.
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nisms. In the second group are firms with no cash reserves or assets
with significant salvage value but that do benefit from subsidies or
unsuitable credit extensions. Given the pervasiveness of these
problems in the economy, particularly the provision of energy at below world market prices, this second group may well be much larger
than the first.34 Effectively addressing the subsidy and credit
problems will cause these firms to close, but they \vill not close otherwise. Improvements in corporate governance \vill have no effect on
this second group. The third group, which is also large, includes firms
with cash reserves or assets \vith significant salvage value that also
benefit from subsidies or unsuitable credit e:;i..-tensions. These firms
\vill not close until there is both an improvement in corporate governance and an end to the subsidies and unsuitable credit e:;i..-tensions.
c. The ZiL Example. Moscow's ailing ZiL truck company is a
useful example of a firm in the third group. The company is a "dinosaur"35 that continues to produce many of the same poor quality
trucks as it did under the Soviet regime, despite the trucks' terrible
reputation and scant market.36 As two reporters note:
The total amount of [post-privatization] state assistance to ZiL
through various channels is estimated at approximately $100
million....
. . . "[T]he plant never regarded the money it received as credits that
had to be paid back." ...
While receiving money for the production of trucks that customers
were unwilling to pay for, ZiL continued to ship them out....
. . . [F]rom force of old Soviet habit, it kept pushing to fulfill a plan
that was long gone, at a time when it should have been cutting production and thinking about structural reorganization.37
34 The Soviet Union built its whole manufacturing sector on a base of deep energy
resource subsidization. These subsidies continue to a considerable extent even today
through provision of these resources at prices below the world level, a problem that is
somewhat disguised by the prevalence of barter transactions. Most of the finns that resulted from the privatization of this sector would be unprofitable in an open economy. See
Gaddy & Ickes, supra note 32, at 7-8.
35 Peter Galuszka & Patricia Kranz, Look Who's Making a Revolution: Shareholders,
Bus. Wk., Feb. 20, 1995, at 60, 60 (noting that ZiL has been "turning out the same basic
truck for 30 years").
36 See Michail Berger & Dmitry Dokuchayev, Divided Authority at ZiL: The Giant
Can No Longer Live in the Old Way but Doesn't Yet Want to Live in the New Way,
Current Dig. Post-Soviet Press, May 15, 1996, at 10, 10-11 (quoting Aleksandr Yefano\',
head of Mikrodin Company).
37 Id (quoting Aleksandr Yefanov); see also James Rupert, Post-Poll Jitters for Russian
Industry, Int'l Herald Trib., July 6-7, 1996, at 9 ("If Mr. Yeltsin now gets serious about
ending state support for dying industries, Zi[L] faces desperate times. Despite ha\ing been
privatized, the plant seems to be having trouble weaning itself from So\•iet-style
subsidies ....").
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As the company continued to fall apart, Moscow Mayor Yuri
Luzhkov acquired for the city a controlling stake in the firm but kept
incumbent management in place.38 Rather than closing the firm and
liquidating its main assets, the Mayor reportedly began ordering city
services to buy ZiL vehicles only.39 He also secured a large new line
of credit on the basis of the firm's main asset, "tens of hectares of
prime land in south Moscow with a potential market value of hundreds of millions of dollars." 40 The Mayor's plans were to relocate the
firm's production facilities, raise about $35 million by selling fortynine-year leases to some of the land, and then transfer the new funds
to the company rather than to shareholders or to more viable firms. 41
But, as one commentator suggests, "it is not clear that even Luzhkov
can create a market for Zi[L] trucks." 42
Shutting down the firm at the outset likely would have been the
residual-maximizing decision. The government could have targeted its
limited subsidies to providing a social safety net for workers,4 3 and the
land could have been sold to its highest value users at a price that

38 Moscow increased its stake to 60% by buying the 30% stake previously owned by
Mikrodin, the main outside shareholders, who had, for a short period, brought in new
management before the city government, labor, and the old managers intervened. See
Sergey Lukianov, Mayor Pulls Out Stops to Rescue ZiL, Moscow limes, Sept. 27, 1996, at
12 ("Luzhkov blamed Mikrodin for failing to boost production. He said lack of proper
management was the main reason ....");Elizabeth Sullivan, Reforms Sour for Disenfranchised, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), June 9, 1996, at 1-A (outside managers were "forcibly escorted off the premises by the security forces of the old" managers).
39 See Lukianov, supra note 38, at 12; ZiL Takes Alternative Road to Capitalism, Russia Express Briefing, Jan. 13, 1997, 1997 WL 9450577.
40 Poul Funder Larsen, Buying Land Is Next Hurdle for Private Firms, Moscow limes,
Nov. 26, 1996, at III (stating that:
Most of Russia's 120,000 privatized firms do not own the land they stand on.
They do not even have a clear lease agreement. Instead, they occupy the land
under a Soviet-era concept of temporary management which gives city officials
a big say in how the land is used and gives companies few rights to sublet, sell
or redevelop.);
see also Lukianov, supra note 38, at 12 (noting that rescue plan includes local and federal
tax breaks, direct subsidies, guaranteed purchases of ZiL output by city, and auctioning
some ZiL real estate, "with 70 percent of the proceeds going to the company and 30 percent to the city government").
41 See Larsen, supra note 40, at III.
42 David Hoffman, The Man Who Rebuilt Moscow: Capitalist Style Could Propel
Mayor to National Power, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1997, at Al.
43 See Moscow Truck Maker Mulls Upgrade Plans, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 22, 1999, Lexis, News Library, Non-US file. As it was, "the plant stopped housing construction long ago, and the plant workers, dissatisfied that they have not received
the apartments once promised to them, intend to petition the International Court of Justice
in the Hague." Id.
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would have substantially benefited shareholders.44 As it was, outside
shareowners "realized that, despite the municipal and federal authorities' special treatment of this flagship of the automotive industry, the
enterprise was a hopeless failure, and [when] they tried to exert some
direct influence on the situation ... [it] proved to be not such an easy
thing to do. "45

2. Pathology 2: Failure to Use Existing Capacity Efficiently
The second type of pathology arises when continued operation, if
undertaken as efficiently as possible and without new investment,
would be a positive net present value decision, but operation is not
done as efficiently as possible. Costs are not minimized, the best price
is not obtained for a given level of output, or a non profit-maximizing
output level is chosen-again, all common problems in Russia.46
Thus, residuals are not maximized. Such firms should not shut down,
but they should deploy existing facilities more efficiently.47 Their
residuals shortfall represents a social welfare diminishing corporate
governance failure.
Consider, for example, the Baltic Shipping Company (BSC),
"Russia's oldest and best known shipping enterprise."4S Under the
Soviets, the firm already had \vide experience working on world markets, but they relied on inexpensive Russian fuel to cover for management deficiencies, and these deficiencies, unlike the low fuel prices,
have persisted into the post-privatization period:
[N]early everyone admits that the management at BSC has simply
not been up to the challenges of a new economy....

44 Cf. Michael A Heller, The 'fragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621, 639 (1998) (suggesting difficulties in selling
land because of fragmented ownership in Russian enterprise assets).
45 Berger & Dokuchayev, supra note 36, at 10-11.
46 As one account notes:
Eyeing [outside investors] warily are entrenched company directors, many of
whom enjoy virtually unchecked command of the production lines they've presided over for decades. Outside investors allege these "Red Directors" are
used to running enterprises according to Soviet tenets: overpricing supplies,
underpricing output and pocketing the rest.
Natasha Mileusnic, The Great Boardroom Revolution, Moscow Times, July 16, 1996, at I.
47 One investment banker looking over the Volga Paper Company "noticed huge, dustcovered crates packed away in the comer of the factory. They contained SIOO million
worth of brand-new Austrian-made equipment. The Russians hadn't bothered unpacking
the stuff." Paul Klebnikov & Caroline Waxler, The \Vtld East, Forbes, Dec. 16, 1996, at

348, 349.
48

Rachel Katz, The Strange Case of the Disappearing Ships, Moscow Times, May 14,

1996, at VII.
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In his parting words, former president Filimonov, who retains a
place on the board, pretty much admitted the management could
not adapt. "Those titles we've become accustomed to hearing, such
as deputy chief of finances, are simply not those functions that these
people have become used to fulfilling." 4 9

Though the firm could be profitable today, Baltic Shipping faces
a "spiral of decline" that could "lead to the company's fleet disappearing completely."50 According to one official, "'It's difficult to say how
many ships we have in operation, because at any moment, we could
get another call saying another ship has been seized [by creditors]."'5 1
The widespread existence of Pathology 2 may mask the potential
extent of Pathology 1. If firms generally are not using their inputs
efficiently, the marginal products of these inputs are likely to be
lower, and thus, in a competitive economy, the price that needs to be
paid for them and the opportunity cost of their use will be lower as
well. A wholesale reduction in Pathology 2 will increase the price and
social opportunity cost of at least some, and quite possibly all, major
classes of inputs. 52 Input price adjustments may increase sharply the
number of firms displaying Pathology 1 as the increased opportunity
cost of their inputs makes their continued operation socially
undesirable.

3.

Pathology 3: Misinvestment of Internally Generated Cash Flow

The third type of pathology arises when a firm uses its internally
generated cash flow to invest in new negative net present value
projects. Instead of making bad investments, such a firm should pay
out this cash flow to shareholders. Shareholders could invest these
Id.
Id.
51 Id. (quoting Yury Sukhorukov, foreign affairs chief, Baltic Regional Organization of
the Seafarers Union of Russia).
52 If the efficiency gains are spread evenly around all classes of inputs, the effect on the
marginal product of each would be positive. If the gains were concentrated primarily with
respect to one class of inputs, for example labor, the effect on marginal productivity is, as a
theoretical matter, ambiguous. On the one hand, the gains increase the number of effec·
tive units of labor represented by each actual unit. On the other hand, the increase in
effective units of labor relative to other inputs decreases the marginal product of each
effective unit of labor. If the first effect outweighs the second, then the marginal product
of labor will increase even if the more effective use of labor is the primary efficiency gain
from restructuring. Whether this is the case depends on the elasticity of substitution of
labor for other inputs. Empirical studies of the United States and other developed econo·
mies suggest that the elasticity is large enough that the marginal product of labor would
increase even under these circumstances. For a more detailed discussion of these points,
see Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate
Whom, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498, 2562-69, 2630-31 {1997).
49

50
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funds better elsewhere in the economy.53 An example of Pathology 3
includes the seemingly responsible act of using funds labeled by accountants as depreciation to replace worn out plant and equipment, if
doing so is a negative net present value project. Pathology 3 can arise
in conjunction with, or independently of, Pathology 2. Significant indirect evidence from two sources suggests that Pathology 3 is widespread in Russia.
First, consider the paucity of interfirm cash flows in Russia. In
any economy, good investment opportunities are unlikely to be spread
so evenly among existing enterprises that interfirm transfers of cash
flows through capital markets are not called for. Nor is the quality of
existing firms' opportunities likely to be consistently superior to the
opportunities that could be found by new firms. Thus, some existing
firms (capital surplus firms) will have cash flows greater than what is
needed to fund all their positive net present value projects; other existing firms (capital deficit firms) will have insufficient cash flows to
fund all such projects. In addition, there will exist new firms with positive net present value projects but that, by definition, have no cash
flows at all. Thus, interfirm cash flow transfers are called for from
surplus firms to deficit firms and new firms. In a market economy
with clearly distinct firms, these transfers are accomplished when surplus firms pay dividends and deficit firms and new firms enter the capital markets, for example through the offering of new equity. In
Russia, firms pay little or nothing in the way of dividends54 and equity
finance is negligible.55 The lack of interfirm transfers strongly suggests that the surplus firms are instead displaying Pathology 3 and
likely investing in negative net present value projects.so
See Brealey & Myers, supra note 12, at 178.
See Merton J. Peck, Russian Privatization: What Basis Does It Provide for a Market
Economy?, 5 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Problems 21, 32 {1995); John Thornhill, "World's
Last Greatest Emerging Market" Back in Favor, Fin. Post (Toronto), July 18, 1997, at 49,
1997 WL 4100028.
55 See Vladimir Popov, The Fmancial System in Russia Compared to Other Transition
Economies: The Anglo-American Versus the German-Japanese Model, 49 Comp. Econ.
Stud. 1, 26 (1999) {finding that equity financing accounts for less than one percent of capital investment in Russia).
56 The lack of interfirm transfers undoubtedly is also in part due to various techniques
that managers use to make non pro rata distributions that result in cash flow diversions to
accounts that they control overseas. Because or these diversions, the firms in\'Olved have
less cash, if any, available to pay dividends. To the extent that a foreign destination was
chosen for these diversions because of a desire to protect what at home would have been
considered stolen money or because it assists an attempt at tax evasion, the expected returns of the foreign investment funds by these diversions are likely to be lower than those
of some of the unfunded projects of Russian firms. The idea here is that absent any distortions on transnational capital flows, the risk-adjusted e.xpected return on investment opportunities in Russia should equal those abroad even if there are fewer good investment
53

54
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The second source of indirect evidence for Pathology 3 relates to
firms' failure to make pro rata distributions of residuals. One way
that controlling shareholders can divert a disproportionate share of
residuals to themselves is to have the firm invest in projects personally
benefiting these shareholders. On balance, controlling shareholders
may prefer to fund such projects, even if they have a negative net
present value-their personal benefits more than outweigh the reduction in share value from implementing the project. Controlling shareholders will be able to indulge these preferences if the mechanisms to
constrain non pro rata distribution of dividends are weak. The abundant evidence of non pro rata distributions in Russia also strongly suggests that Pathology 3 is likely to be prevalent.
4.

Pathology 4: Failure to Implement Positive Net Present Value
Projects
The fourth pathology of residual nonmaximization arises directly
or indirectly when a firm identifies, but then fails to act on, positive
net present value projects. If others do not pick up the opportunity,
the firm's failure reduces social welfare because of the forgone chance
to deploy funds to produce a return greater than the cost.
Pathology 4 is a direct result of corporate governance failures in
cases where managers, due to weak control mechanisms, reject a positive net present value project because they wish to avoid personal risk.
Managers tend to be risk averse because they cannot diversify away
the unsystematic risk associated with any individual firm project. If
managers can get away with it, they may reject projects with high expected returns if the projects have high unsystematic risk as well, even
though such rejections are not in the interests of shareholders or society as a whole. By contrast, portfolio shareholders, who can diversify
their holdings, are risk neutral with respect to unsystematic projectlevel risk. Management risk aversion causes problems everywhere,
but the problems are likely accentuated in established Russian firms
because incumbent managers typically internalized a high degree of
risk aversion through Soviet-era careers in which punishment for major mistakes far exceeded gains from major successes.57
projects in Russia due to the Russian economy's serious problems. The diversions cited
here represent a diversion that creates a capital shortage in Russia relative to the quality of
its investment opportunities. The reductions in residuals resulting from such diversions are
examples of the complex mixture of corporate governance failures in which the method by
which a non pro rata distribution is undertaken leads to a failure to maximize residuals as
well, a point discussed in more detail infra Part I.D.
57 The average age of enterprise directors is still over 50 years. See Joseph R. Blasi et
al., Kremlin Capitalism: The Privatization of the Russian Economy 203 tbl.10 (1997). The
OECD notes that "[t]hese directors were trained under the Soviet system. Although man-
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Corporate governance failures also can lead firms indirectly to
forgo positive net present value projects. Consider a firm with willing
managers and with the prospect of a value-creating project that is nevertheless unable to proceed because financing is unavailable at a price
equal to the capital's social opportunity cost.SS The lack of :financing
may be an externality imposed by corporate governance failures in
other firms. When firms generally fail to make pro rata distributions
and to maximize residuals, they may undermine severely the ability of
firms with good projects to acquire :financing through new equity offerings. Banks are the usual alternative sources for outside finance,
but in Russia, banks are providing little long-term corporate lending.
The lack of a vibrant new equity market or of bank financing proves
fatal for good projects in firms that do not generate sufficient internal
funds to self-finance the project.s9
In Russia, failures by established firms to take advantage of what
appear to be positive net present value projects can be spectacularly
large. Consider, for example, the saga at Segezhabumprom, one of
Russia's biggest pulp and paper mills.60 Swedish owners acquired a
fifty-seven percent stake in the firm, while a major pulp distributor
and the Karelian regional government controlled most of the rest of
agement skills were often important for promotion (as were political ties) during Smiet
power, entrepreneurial ingenuity for successful restructuring or reorganization involving
risk was usually not rewarded." OECD, supra note 1, at 158 n.171.
58 It is hard to get a sense of the extent of this problem for established (as opposed to
new) Russian firms. Many firms face one of three choices: continued operation in its current form, massive investment to build an entirely new factory, or dissolution. Often, continued operation in the firm's current form would be a highly inefficient choice because
there is no market for its product at prices sufficient to pay for the inputs and for any
opportunity costs associated with its fixed assets. And funds for a massive investment in a
new factory are often not available. As a result,
The conflict between production-oriented Soviet-era management and aggressive new owners has been played out at hundreds of factories across the country. The fledgling entrepreneurs have lacked the massive capital required to
make the ageing red giants profitable and their attempts to make money by
shutting them down and selling off their assets have proven politically explosive. As a result, privatisation has often failed to deliver effecti\'e
restructuring.
ZiL Takes Alternative Road to Capitalism, supra note 39. It is not clear whether the lack
of funds is solely due to capital market defects that arise from economy·\\ide corporate
governance problems or whether, even without these problems, the new factory would be
an insufficiently promising investment project to get funded. In general, entrepreneurs
seem likely to claim the former reason.
59 Non pro rata distributions that result in cash flow diversions to accounts that managers control overseas also may result in firms without sufficient internal resources ha\ing to
forgo projects that have a positive net present value when discounted at a rate reflecting
capital's true social opportunity cost. See supra note 56 (discussing di\'ersions).
60 See Greg Mcivor, Risk and Reward in Equal Measure, Fm. Times (London}, Mar. 3,
1998, at 17.
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the shares. Early in the relationship, when the town of Segezha had
run out of fuel oil, the Swedes were sufficiently eager that they agreed
to "bum expensive wood chips, normally used in paper production, to
prevent the town from freezing."6 1 Later, the Swedes identified, and
committed to make, over $100 million in new investments. However,
the modernization plans provoked local suspicion of job losses,
prompting a campaign to force the Swedes out, which included judicial findings that the Swedes' initial share purchases had been illegal.62
A break point occurred when the Russian co-owners-the regional
government and the major distributor-refused to co-fund the working capital to keep the plant open. 63 By the end, the Swedes abandoned the investment and wrote off their ownership stake, but only
after the existing managers and local government officials drove them
off using "mafia-style threats against [their] staff. " 64 A story of this
sort is likely to scare off even a determined large-scale investor, which
in most countries could protect itself using the control powers that
come with large shareownership. This story is even more discouraging
for individual noncontrol portfolio investors. As discussed further in
Part II, stories like that of Segezhabumprom also suggest that Russian
corporate law enforcement may be so weak that the results of the ordinary processes of corporate decisionmaking are not respected by officials charged with enforcing property rights. Incumbent managers
still appear to have de facto property rights in assets whose title is
nominally in the hands of the corporation.
5.

Pathology 5: Failure to Identify Positive Net Present Value
Projects

The fifth type of pathology arises when a firm's managers fail
even to identify positive net present value projects that the firm,
through its specialization and the resulting accumulation of knowledge, is particularly well positioned to find. 65 Organizational capacity
to identify these opportunities is related to the incentives available to

61 Swedish-Owned Paper Mill in Karelia Paralyzed by Fuel Shortage, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Jan. 3, 1997, available in Lexis, News Library, Non-US file.
62 See Mcivor, supra note 60, at 17.
63 See Greg Mcivor, Assi Hurt by Russian Plant Write-Off, Fin. Ttmes (London), Feb.
13, 1998, at 29.
64 Mcivor, supra note 60, at 17; see also infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing Sidanko story).
65 See Whitehouse, supra note 16 (describing paper and pulp company that failed to
produce more paper in face of declining pulp prices and suffered financially).
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firm employees for identifying such projects as well as the incentives
for them to help each other in a joint endeavor to do so.66
In the United States, venture capital significantly reduces the social costs of Pathology 5 by making available funds for promising
projects that employees identify, but managers misassess. Venture
capital also significantly lessens the effects of Pathology 4 on the U.S.
economy by making spinoffs possible in which employees proposing
promising projects can implement the proposal by creating a new firm,
despite the employer's rejection. The possibility of getting rich in a
spinoff gives employees substantial incentives to identify positive net
present value projects even if they work for firms that ultimately may
not implement the ideas.67 Furthermore, when spinoffs occur,
Pathologies 4 and 5 do not harm the economy because the project is
implemented anyway.68
In Russia, venture capital is not readily available.69 Therefore,
Pathology 5 is likely to be more prevalent in Russia than in the United
States, and Pathology 4 is likely to be more damaging. Ronald Gilson
and Bernard Black have argued persuasively that a necessary condition for developing venture capital is a vibrant equity market.70 But
Russia will not be able to develop equity markets until most of its
firms try to maximize residuals and give pro rata distributions.7 1
66 See Joseph Bankman & Ronald Gilson, Why Start-ups?, 51 Stan. L Rev. 289, 301-04
(1999) (arguing that providing incentives to individual employees to develop inno\•ations
may hamper overall research and development efforts of firms, as indMduals may hoard
information that is useful to other research and development personnel in effort to protect
their proprietary claim over information).
67 See id. at 306.
68 A record of successful spinoffs demonstrates a failure in the finance processes of
established firms and hence shows some mix of Pathologies 4 and 5. One study of the
semiconductor industry shows the reason that proponents of successful spinoffs took their
ideas elsewhere is that top management of employer firms simply did not perceive the
ideas to be worth substantial investment See Merritt B. Fox, Finance and Industrial Performance in a Dynamic Economy: Theory, Practice, and Policy 305 (1987).
69 See World Bank, supra note 17, at 64 fig.3.2 (showing that direct foreign investment
inflows as percentage of 1994 GDP is lower for Russia than for several other transition
economies).
10 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capi~I Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. Fm. Econ. 243, 245 (1998) (explaining that
vibrant venture capital market is dependent on ability of venture capitalists to exit from
start-ups through initial public offerings, because venture capital providers desire exit
mechanism that will allow them to enter into implicit contracts with entrepreneurs concerning future control of firms).
71 See, e.g., Norris, supra note 5, at A20 (concluding that
If Russia is ever to become an economic success story, its oil "ill play an important role. But before that happens, a Russian Morgan-someone who understands Russian capitalism and earns the trust of overseas investOIS-\\ill
have to come along to assure that a dollar invested is not sure to become a
dollar stolen. The Yukos affair shows Russia is a long way from that goal.).
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Again, we see the cumulative, self-reinforcing tendency of multiple
corporate governance pathologies.
C.

The Failure to Make Pro Rata Distributions

The second feature of good corporate governance is that a firm
makes the residuals it generates available on a pro rata basis to the
residual claimants, that is, to the common shareholders in an investorowned company. Much of modem corporate law has been built
around this principle, not only rules requiring that dividends and distributions be made pro rata, but also the basic fiduciary rules policing
non arms-length transactions involving insiders and the corporation.12
In postprivatization Russia, violation of this second feature has been
the most visible and widely reported symptom of bad corporate governance. Just as nonmaximization comes in different flavors, Russian
firms exhibit a wide range of non pro rata distributions that we simplify into two main groups, each with many variations. Loosely, one
type is what we call "diversion of claims" and the other "diversion of
assets." We explore each in tum.
1.

Pathology 6: Diversion of Claims

To give just a few illustrations ranging from blatant to subtle,
managers divert claims of the corporation when they refuse to register
share purchases by outsiders,73 refuse to recognize board directors
properly elected by outside shareholders,74 dilute stock in ways that
72 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel argue that this statement of basic norms in
corporate law needs refinement. Unequal divisions of gains from corporate activity will be
tolerated, they suggest, provided that the transaction makes no shareholder worse off. Sec
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
14344 (1991). Their refinement is valid to an extent, but whether the refinement should
be stated so broadly is irrelevant to our discussion of the Russian situation. Few of the
many blatant violations of the principle against non pro rata distributions that we see in
Russia possibly could be justified as necessary to permit transactions that leave no share·
holder worse off.
73 See, e.g., David Fairlamb, Moscow Madness, Institutional Investor, July 1995, at 132,
134 ("Some companies think nothing of striking shareholders' names off registers if they
look like they're becoming a nuisance."); Mileusnic, supra note 46, at I ("One notorious
incident involved Krasnoyarsk Aluminum, which deleted from its share register-the only
legal proof of ownership-a 20 percent stake held by the British Trans World Group, effectively wiping out its holding.").
74 One long-running case involves the Novolipetsk Metal Factory, one of Russia's larg·
est metal producers. Western investment funds were unable, over the course of several
years, to place anybody on the board of directors, despite controlling over 40% of the
firm's shares and despite cumulative voting rules that should have guaranteed them some
voice. See Mark Whitehouse, Novolipetsk Slams Foreign Investors, Moscow Times, Mar.
15, 1997, at 10. According to Novolipetsk's chairman, Vladimir Skorokhodov, '"In Russia's special situation, the master is, after all, not the shareholder.'" Id.; see also Mileusnic,
supra note 46, at I (describing Western investors' unsuccessful attempt to gain board seats);
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freeze out outsiders by issuing shares to insiders for inadequate consideration,75 or engage in fake bankruptcies that wipe out shareowners' interests.76 The key feature of these non pro rata distributions is
that the people perpetrating them, usually insider owner-managers,
are keeping the firm intact, including its assets and opportunities.
They gain instead by manipulating the corporate legal system, the
bankruptcy law, and other laws to reduce or eliminate the claims of
some or all of the firm's shareholders on the firm's residuals-usually
wiping out the outside minority shareholders.77 As one investor put it,
"'A 51 % shareholding interest in a Russian company conveys to the
owner a license to steal from the remaining 49%."'78
John Thornhill, Risks of Russian Market fa-posed, Fm. TlDles (L-Ondon), Mar. 25, 1997. at 2
(same). Finally, in 1998, the outside investors were able to win seats on the board after the
general director switched sides in this "marquee shareholders' rights case:• Shareholders
\Vm Two-Year Case, Can Appoint Board Members to Firm, Int'! Sec. Reg. Rep.. Jan. 29,
1998, at 10, 10.
75 See Geoff Wmestock, Ship Firm Managers, Shareholders Face Off in Russia, J.
Com., Apr. 24, 1995, at lOA (reporting that:
Managers have seen their position change dramatically over the last year "ith
the public sale of their stock to outside investors. Shareholders, for one, have
started to ask for higher profits and a voice in the company.
Investors charge that management decided on a simple solution to the problem. They unilaterally issued themselves enough shares to take back control of
their companies.);
see also Gary Peach, Fmancial Ethics Crackdown Bodes Well for Shareholders, Moscow
TlDles, Feb. 24, 1998, available in Lexis, World Library, Mostms file ("Dalmoreprodukt,
Russia's largest seafood exporter, is in the process of watering down outsiders' interest by
means of an insider share issuance for select major stakeholders, managers, and
employees.").
76 See, e.g., Andrew Higgins, As One Bank Shows, Bankruptcy in Russia Is a Real Cat
Fight, Wall St J., Apr. 5, 1999, at Al (reporting that:
[J]ust as Russia's earlier drive to put state property in private hands often
yielded cozy inside deals instead of a spur to efficiency, bankruptcy has mutated into a cat fight often involving shadowy cabals and allegations of asset
stripping. "Many enterprises are being artificially bankrupted, to be taken
over by some groups," Prime :Minister Yevgeny Primakov [said].);
Kranz, supra note 2, at 45 ("In regions across Russia, both local governments and creditors
have filed bankruptcy suits against subsidiaries of Potanin's Sidanko Oil. The suits ostensibly seek payment of back taxes and delinquent energy bills. But the real prize could ba
Sidanko's oil assets.").
77 See Norris, supra note 5, at A20 (citing Yukos example, in which minority shareholders were barred from voting:
A judge had ruled that since the minority holders all planned to \'Ole the same
way, they must be in league with one another and therefore in violation of
antitrust laws because they had not registered as such. The minority shareholders were not invited to the bearing that led to the ruling.
The shareholders managed to get another judge to rule that they could Yote at
one of the meetings. But his ruling was simply ignored.).
78 Investor Hell, J. Com., June 15, 1998, at 6A (editorial) (quoting E. Michael Hunter,
president of Dart Management).
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In one notorious case that has dragged on for years, the incumbent manager at Kuban Gypsum-Knauf refused to vacate even though
he had been fired by the majority owner, a German company.79 Supported by the local government, the manager installed Cossack
guards, held his own shareholder meetings, locked out the owners, diluted the owners' stock, and ignored dozens of court rulings against
him over the years.8° Finally, and for the first time in Russia, the German owners were able to wrestle their way back in, following intervention by a commission headed by the Prime Minister. 81 According
to one Knauf lawyer, "'It's a sort of legal nihilism. . . . The farther
from Moscow, the less attention they pay to the legal side of things.
There is no understanding of a final court decision.' "82
And managers are not the only ones diverting control. Recent
reports suggest that local and regional governments with minority
share interests have begun engaging in the same game, forcing firms
into bankruptcy over unpaid taxes and then asserting control, essentially a form of renationalization in cases where tax rates are absurdly
high, exceeding 100% marginal rates. 83 Also, outside shareholders
such as those associated with financial-industrial groups (FIGs) may
take over firms, replace managers, and then also freeze out minority
shareholders, including employees. 84
Many of these tactics are familiar to students of the history of
western corporate law, but in Russia this game seems limited only by
the creativity of those controlling the firm: The Russian regulatory
apparatus has been notoriously ineffective in controlling such diversions. To give one example, in late 1997, insider shareholders had the
Sidanko oil company offer exclusively to themselves, for nominal con79 See Lyudmila Leontyeva, Red Director's Stronghold in Kuban, Moscow News, Oct.
30, 1997, in Lexis, World Library, Mosnws file.
80 See Mark Whitehouse, Germans Cry Foul in Gypsum Plant Feud, Moscow Times,
Nov. 29, 1997, in Lexis, World Library, Mostms file; Mark Whitehouse, Under Siege, Moscow Times, Dec. 9, 1997, in Lexis, World Library, Mostms file.
81 See Katy Daigle, Nemstov Hails Win for Investors' Rights, Moscow Times, Mar. 10,
1998, at 13, 1998 WL 11690493.
82 Mark Whitehouse, Take 'Em to Court, Moscow Times, Feb. 10, 1998, in Lexis, World
Library, Mostms file (quoting Innokenti Ivanov).
83 See Elizabeth V. Mooney, Russia Must Implement Tax, Corporate Governance Reforms, RCR Radio Comm. Rep., Feb. 28, 2000, at 26, 2000 WL 9540310 ("'The tax burden
is arbitrary and capricious, frequently more than net earnings because companies are taxed
on gross income,' [Professor Richard E.] Ericson said. 'This amounts to confiscation of the
capital available for investment."').
84 See European Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., supra note 24, at 143 box 8.1 (dis·
cussing financial-industrial groups (FIGs) and need to limit their powers); see also infra
notes 214-27 and accompanying text (discussing FIGs).
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sideration, a form of bonds that was convertible into Sidanko shares.SS
Once the conversion occurred, the remaining shareholders would see
their ownership stake diluted down to one third of their original claim,
yet the company gained no significant new assets.86 The only unusual
aspect of this share dilution was that for the first time in its history, the
Russian Securities and Exchange Commission, in the glare of particularly intense negative press about the scheme, intervened in early 1998
to block the issuance of the convertible bonds. As a result, the majority insiders agreed to negotiate with minority shareholders.87 Such
regulatory oversight has been extremely rare in Russia. But even this
victory was Pyrrhic. Since then, Sidanko insiders apparently have
forced the company into a fake bankruptcy, effectively freezing out
another major shareholder, British Petroleum, which had invested
$500 million in the firm for ten percent ownership, a stake now apparently worthless despite the valuable assets that the reorganized firm
will control.88
2.

Pathology 7: Diversion of Assets

The second major class of non pro rata distributions, and the last
pathology in our framework, involves direct diversion of assets and
opportunities belonging to the firm. The key feature of this type of
corporate governance failure is that insiders leave the ownership
structure intact as they hollow out the firm.89 For managers, diversion
of assets may be accomplished by outright looting of the firm-taking
cash or assets belonging to the firm and effectively giving title to
85 See Jeanne Whalen, FSC Cracks Down on Yukos, Sidanko, Moscow Times, Feb. 19,
1998, in Lexis, World Library, Mostms file (noting that Russian Federal Securities Commission action to cancel offering perhaps marks '"turning point'" (quoting attorney Walter
Rieman)); Jeanne Whalen, Shareholders Rights: Round 2, Moscow Times, Feb. 17, 1998,
available in Lexis, World Library, Mostms file [hereinafter Whalen, Shareholders Rights]
(reporting subsequent developments). In the interest of full disclosure, the authors of this
Article should state that they served as consultants to some minority shareholders in this
matter.
86 See Whalen, Shareholders Rights, supra note 85 (stating that convertible bond issue
excluding minority shareholders would have tripled Sidanko's charter capital).
'ir1 See Sidanko Offers Settlement to :Minority Shareholders, Russia & Commonwealth
Bus. L. Rep., Mar. 25, 1998, in Lexis, News Library, Rcblr file.
88 See Dilemma Over BP Role in Oil, Gas Industry, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 12, 1999, available in Lexis, News Library, Non-US file; Vitaly Makarchev,
British Petroleum-Amoco Intends to Secede from Sidanko, TASS, Nov. 22, 1999, ;:millable in Lexis, Europe Library, Tass file.
89 See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 83 ("Asset stripping and its companion, transfer pricing, are two other commonplace occurrences that victimize investors. [According to one
analyst], '[a]sset stripping involves transactions with affiliates on non-market terms, and it
siphons assets from minority shareholders.... Transfer pricing involves the sale of goods
and services at below-market prices.'" (quoting Lee Wolosk-y)).
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themselves. 90 Or it may take the form of sweetheart business deals
with firms controlled by insiders or their families, 91 using, for example,
transfer pricing agreements that move profits to subsidiaries or parents in which the insiders have a larger interest. 92 According to one
report,
Protecting sweetheart financial deals is behind much of the hostility
to outside investors. Virtually every Russian enterprise, big or
small, is surrounded by 'independent' companies set up by managers or their families. In many cases, sales and purchasing contracts
are structured to go through these firms, raking off profits from the
main enterprise.93

Russian firms also engage in non pro rata distribution of residuals
when they continue to pay for redundant shareholder employees or
when they provide public services without compensation or relief
from reasonably and equitably imposed tax obligations. The experience of Tatneft shows a simple but creative form of non pro rata distribution in favor of a local government shareholder. According to one
report,
Tatneft is the victim of parasitism, pure and simple. . . . [Regional]
bureaucrats who control the company essentially were under orders
to borrow as much money as possible on international capital markets to support the region's economy and the government's pet
programs....
. . . The company piled on almost $800 million in debt in 1997 alone,
and now has over $1 billion of the stuff on its balance sheet. Tatneft
was forced to make sizeable loans to the regional government (now
broke) ....94

Neither the diversion of assets nor the diversion of claims noted
in the previous section necessarily decreases social welfare in a static
analysis-the diversions merely redistribute wealth from one group of
90 See, e.g., Edwin Dolan, Resisting Shock of New, Moscow Times, Apr. 8, 1997, at 10
(calling some insider managers "simply bandits").
91 See Daigle, supra note 2 ("In Russia, company directors and managers are routinely
accused of insider dealing, which includes everything from accepting bribes to act against
their company's interests to selling assets or shares to relatives or friends.").
92 See, e.g., Jeanne Whalen, Navigating the Russian Subsidiaries Minefield, Moscow
Times, Mar. 10, 1998, at III, 1998 WL 11690632 ("Share swaps aside, transfer pricing is the
practice most feared by subsidiary shareholders. Holding companies force subsidiaries to
sell their oil at below-market prices, and then resell it for a profit that is kept by the holding company."); Whalen, Shareholders Rights, supra note 85 {discussing transfer pricing at
Tomskneft, about which one minority shareholder protested, "(t]ax debts and the cost of
production are left with the subsidiaries, while profits are illegally upstreamed to the parent" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
93 Patricia Kranz, Shareholders at the Gate, Bus. Wk. (int'l ed.), June 2, 1997, at 60,
1997 WL 8270209.
94 Peach, supra note 3.
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owners to another. But moving to a dynamic analysis changes the
story. If outsiders do not believe that they will receive pro rata distributions, then they will be unwilling generally to treat shares as financial assets, and they will be unwilling to provide equity finance in
exchange for anything less than total control.95 So the prevalence of
diversion imposes a substantial externality on the Russian enterprise
sector. Because potential outside investors cannot protect against ex
post diversions of their investments in firms that turn out to be successful, they have little ex ante incentive to invest on terms that would
be appealing to firms with positive net present value projects.%
D. A Simple Framework Meets Complex Failures
Table 1 below summarizes our framework of Russia's corporate
governance pathologies. Real world cases do not fit neatly into one or
another of the boxes we describe, but rather represent complex mixtures of several failures. To start, if managers are neither sufficiently
constrained nor given incentives to prevent the diverting of claims,
they similarly will be able to divert assets-both types of diversion
may be undertaken at once, often in ways that are hard to tease
apart.97 Next, there is a potential interaction between the failure to
make pro rata distributions and the failure to maximize residuals.
Some tactics used to effect a non pro rata distribution of a firm's
wealth have no direct effect on residual maximization. This generally
would be true of diversion of claims and of brazen, outright theft of
assets. Other tactics, however, do reduce a firm's residuals; for examSee, e.g., Blasi et al., supra note 57, at 165.
See id.
97 Consider the recent looting of Moscow City Telephone Network (MGTS). Even
though it is the largest telecommunications company in Russia, its share price dropped
95% from its high. According to one report. majority ownership was transferred from a
public body to a
secretive outfit that bas links both political and economic to Moscow Mayor
Yury Luzhkov. Any growth potential for the stock has thus been eliminated .... [I]t is safe to say that [the new owners] have no concern for shareholders of MGTS. What [they] care about. though, is getting Luzhkov elected
to the presidency, so MGTS' available cash will be utilized accordingly.
Peach, supra note 3; see also Gary Peach, Mayor's Industrial Policy Carries Big Costs,
Moscow Times, Dec. 8, 1998, at 16, 1998 WL 11691775 (noting that dkerting control of
"prize municipal assets" ensures that these firms' "bountiful cash flow" \\ill be a\'3ilable to
help Luzhkov "meet the presidential challenge in 2000").
For another complex diversion example, see Alan S. Cullison, Russian Share Shuffle
Maddens Investors, Wall St J., July 23, 1999, at A12 (discussing Yukos Oil company's quiet
transfer of bulk of its two most valuable petroleum-producing assets to offshore entities);
see also Alan S. Cullison, Yukos Transfers Two Oil Units to Offshore Fmns, Wall St. J.,
June 4, 1999, at A12 (noting earlier part of saga in which tycoon who controls Yukos had
"barred minority investors from shareholder meetings at three Yukos subsidiaries and
pushed through permission for massive share issues that will dilute im·estors• holdings").
95

96
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1

FRAMEWORK OF RUSSIAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PATHOLOGIES
I. Nonmaximization of Residuals
Pathology 1:

Unreformable valuedestroying firms fail to close

Pathology 2:

Viable firms fail to use
existing capacity efficiently

Pathology 3:

Firms misinvest internally
generated cash flows

Arises when an unreformable value-destroying firm can
stay in operation by dissipating cash reserves or
salvageable assets. Corporate governance is not the key
issue when the firm has no reserves or salvageable assets,
or when subsidies or unsuitable credits are present.
Arises when continued firm operation, if undertaken as
efficiently as possible and without new investment, would
be a positive net present value (NPV) decision; but costs
are not minimized, the best price is not obtained for given
output, or a non profit-maximizing output level is chosen.
Arises when a firm uses internally generated cash flow to
invest in new negative NPV projects instead of paying out
this cash flow to shareholders who could invest the funds
better elsewhere in the economy.

Arises when a firm identifies but then fails to act on
positive NPV projects. Managers tend to be risk averse
because they are unable to diversify away unsystematic
risk of a firm's project. If others do not pick up the
opportunity, the firm's failure also reduces social welfare.
Pathology 5:
Arises when a firm's managers fail to identify positive
Firms fail to identify positive NPV projects that the firm is particularly well positioned
NPV projects
to find. The possibility of venture financing and spinoffs
can reduce this pathology's prevalence and social costs.
II. Non Pro Rata Distributions
Pathology 6:
Arises when some residual owners of a firm manipulate
Firms fail to prevent
corporate, bankruptcy, and other laws to shift claims on
diversion of claims
residuals away from other residual owners-often by
diluting shares held by outside minority shareholders.
Pathology 7:
Arises when some residual owners privately appropriate
Firms fail to prevent
assets and opportunities belonging to the firm, but leave
diversion of assets
the firm's formal ownership structure intact.
Pathology 4:
Firms fail to implement
positive NPV projects

pie, when owner-managers grant themselves unjustifiably large perquisites,98 make non arms-length sweetheart deals involving the
company and its insiders,99 or engage in direct thefts of assets that
require considerable efforts to cover up.
Finally, a management intently focused on, and especially skilled
in, diversions may have neither the time nor the ability to give adequate attention to maximizing residuals as well. Consider AvtoVAZ,
See, e.g., Blasi et al., supra note 57, at 87.
The perquisites are unlikely to give the insiders as much utility as the cash that they
would cost. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 312-13 (1976)
(outlining increase in appropriation as owner-managers' percentage of equity decreases).
The sweetheart deals are unlikely to be with the least cost provider of the service or good
needed.
98
99
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Russia's largest automaker. The company evidences several of the
pathologies of nonmaximization of residuals: They continue to employ 114,000 workers and essentially comprise the town of Togliatti;
production takes 450 worker-hours per car, compared with fifteen
worker-hours for Toyota; seven of ten current production models
were designed in the 1970s; the firm lacks working capital; and the size
of the plant makes changeover to new production ex1remely ex-pensive.100 Poor management undermines the company in many ways:
Working capital disappears, "insider deals and criminal groups sap
would-be profits, and attempts at reform have been half-baked at
best."101 According to one analyst, "'The company is going to die a
death by a thousand cuts. It's just going to sit there ... until someone
sees the potential value in some of its assets, strips them out and creates a different franchise or does a complete management overhaul.' "102 With its mix of management failures, the company became
the country's largest tax laggard. 103 To get an ex-tension on tax arrears, the firm guaranteed that it would dilute its stock enough to give
fifty-one percent of voting shares to the government if the firm missed
two tax payments.104 But then the firm proved unable to finish cars,
because '"[a]lmost the entire amount of income [was] used to pay
taxes."' 105 After missing several tax payments, AvtoVAZ agreed to
what amounts to renationalization.106
II
THE ROLE OF INITIAL CONDITIONS IN
RUSSIAN PRIVATIZATION

The preceding discussion establishes the severity of corporate
governance problems in Russia and the mechanisms by which these
100 See Alexander M. Jenkyn, Russian Auto Manufacturers, Hobbled by Inefficient
Management, Look to Foreign Investors, East/West Executive Guide, May 1997, available
in Dow Jones Interactive <http://djinteractive.com>.
101 Mark Whitehouse, Slow Death, Moscow Tunes, June 16, 1998, in Lexis, World Library, Mostms file (recounting at length AvtoVAZ's management difficulties and slow
decline).
102 Id. (quoting automobile analyst Victor Frumkin).
103 See Russia's Nemtsov Threatens Asset Seizures, Bankruptcies over Huge Tax Arrears, AFX News, Sept 23, 1997, available in Dow Jones Interactive <http://
djinteractive.com>.
104 See Avtovaz to Issue New Shares, Russian Bus. News Update, Sept. l, 1997, 1997
WL9832802.
105 Auto Giant Labours Under Tax Burden, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. June
5, 1998, in Lexis, News Library, Non-US file (quoting AvtoVAZ chairman Vladimir
Kadannikov).
106 See Kirill Koriukin, Debt-Laden AvtoVAZ Hands State 50% Stake, Moscow Tunes,
Dec. 31, 1998, 1998 WL 11692046.
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problems inflict damage on the real economy. Standard explanations
of these corporate governance failures include the low level of corporate transparency, the lack of effective methods for adjudicating
claimed violations of corporate law and enforcing the resulting judgments, and the absence of a network of trust among Russian businesspersons.107 While these explanations are important, they are common
to all transition econ0mies to one extent or another. 108 Without discounting these other explanations, we believe that to understand why
Russian corporate governance problems have been so severe109 it is
helpful to include consideration of the initial conditions of Russian
privatization, in particular, the often untenable boundaries of newly
privatized firms and the insider-dominated ownership and control
structures.
These initial conditions are unique to Russia and most of the
other former Soviet republics. 110 They result from a privatization program that followed the course of least resistance. The domestic Russian architects of privatization and their foreign advisers believed it
politically necessary to move quickly. As with real estate privatization,111 the initial path in corporate privatization represents not only
political expediency, but also the primacy of pure economists over
those more sensitive to the bargaining implications of packaging
rights. The reformers hoped, naively as it turned out, that regardless
of whoever initially received resources, these resources would flow
naturally to their highest value users after markets were established.
The reformers underestimated the roadblocks that the initial conditions would continue to impose for resource reallocation. In this Part,
we detail some of these initial conditions and then explore how they
have contributed to Russian corporate governance failures and the resulting dismal economic performance.

See Black et al., supra note 1, at 1750-77 (discussing these factors).
See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate
Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911, 1915 (1996) (emphasizing similarities among different emerging capitalist economies but characterizing Russia as extreme).
109 See, e.g., id.; Melissa Akin, Stalled Transition, Moscow Times, Nov. 16, 1999, at 15,
1999 WL 6809815 (discussing release of 1999 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report criticizing Russia's economic reforms).
110 See, e.g., Black & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 1915; Martin Wolf, nansition Proves
Long and Hard, Fm. Tnnes (London), Nov. 10, 1999, at II (contrasting transition in republics of former Soviet Union with smoother transitions made in eastern and central Europe
and Baltics).
111 See Heller, supra note 44, at 633-59 (showing how poorly conceived real estate privatization can lead to "tragedy of the anticommons").
107
108
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A. Initial Conditions in Russia
1. Untenable Firm Boundaries
The first unique feature of Russian privatization is the bizarrely
tangled and complex pattern of firm boundaries. To crystallize the
problem, we compare the way in which firm boundaries are defined in
developed competitive economies with how they were determined
during privatization in Russia.
a. Firm Boundaries in Developed Competitive Economies. Transaction cost economics provides an easy way to understand the nature of firm boundaries in a developed competitive
economy. As transaction cost economists envision the world, a country's productive economic activities consist of a set of transactionspotentially value-enhancing reallocations of goods and services-that
occur between two or more parties. Every transaction that is not simultaneous and unambiguous in its implications for each party requires some kind of mechanism to govern the actions of the parties
over time. In the simplest model, there are only two possible mechanisms, either an easily enforceable contract that specifies for each possible future state of nature what each party must do (referred to as a
"well-specified contract"), or a firm. With a firm, one party owns all
the assets related to making the transaction value-enhancing. The
owner enters into an agreement \vith another party in which the
owner promises compensation and the other party promises in return
to do whatever, within a specified range of activities, the firm owner
commands it to do.112 In this simple model, every transaction in the
economy occurs in one of two places: either \vithin a firm-i.e., it
occurs under this command arrangement-or between a firm (or
other individual) and another firm (or individual) pursuant to a wellspecified contract. A firm's boundary is defined, on the one hand, by
the transactions that occur \vithin it and, on the other, by the transactions that occur between it and others. Thus, for example, an auto
manufacturer might produce its own seats or it might purchase them
from outside suppliers. In the first instance, the reallocations of resources \vithin the firm necessary for seats to be available to install in
the cars would involve transactions \vithin the firm. In the second instance, the transaction necessary to make the seats available would be
112 This is the simple model that underlies Coase's seminal 1937 article. See Ronald H.
Coase, The Nature of the Frrm, 4 Economica 386 {1937), reprinted in R.H. Coase, The
Frrm, the Market, and the Law 33 {1988). Modem work in transaction cost economics
identifies a wide range of governance mechanisms between the two e:>.1remes described in
the simple model, see infra note 114, but the simple model is sufficient to illustrate the
important points in the discussion here.
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governed by a contract and would involve a transaction between the
auto firm and another firm.
The least cost approach to governing some transactions is by
command within a firm; for other transactions, by well-specified contracts with outsiders. The central tenet of transaction cost economics
is that, in a competitive economy, market forces push transactions toward the mechanism that minimizes governance costs, referred to as
"transaction costs," 113 a process that in turn determines firm boundaries. The work of transaction cost economists suggests plausible, and
in some instances empirically verifiable, reasons why in developed
competitive economies we see the existing pattern of firm
boundaries. 114
b. Firm Boundaries in Russia. In Russia, the privatization process created an initial set of firms that divided up national economic
activity in ways largely unrelated to the concerns of transaction cost
minimization. Each privatized firm had a management team, workers,
assets, and product mix that roughly corresponded to an administrative unit in the old Soviet economy. Often this unit was largely geographically based, so that a firm might encompass all the economic
activity occurring within a given town or district, perhaps including a
major enterprise such as an auto manufacturer, activities constituting
any locally produced inputs for that enterprise, and other activities
that meet consumption needs of local residents, such as a dairy or a
bakery. The firm was also often highly integrated horizontally, being
the only such firm in the country, or one of only a few, that produced
its main product, even though in many cases scale economies did not
require such a high level of concentration. 115 The boundaries of such
a firm may (or may not) have made sense within a centrally planned
and managed economy, but they in no way correspond to the boundaSee Williamson, supra note 10, at 1200.
For representative work, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of
Capitalism (1985) (applying transaction cost economics to various economic institutions);
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Con·
tracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297 (1978) (discussing postcontractual opportunistic be·
havior as impetus for intrafirm contracting). Oliver Hart's "property rights" approach
further explains the forces that define firm boundaries in a competitive economy. Hart
builds on the transaction costs approach by exploring in more detail exactly what changes
when the same transaction occurs within a firm instead of between firms. See Oliver Hart,
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 13-91 (1995).
115 Putting issues of market power aside, there is in any given industry an optimal firm
size that involves a tradeoffbetween scale economies (to the extent that they exist) and tho
managerial incentive problems that tend to grow with firm size. See Hart, supra note 114,
at 51.
113

114
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ries that would minimize transaction costs in a competitive market
economy.
Severstal, one of Russia's largest steel companies, illustrates the
plight of large employers in one-factory towns. The company's 48,000
employees make up the dominant wage base of Cherepovets, a city of
300,000; and the firm alone contributes more than one-third of the
regional government's budget. 116 Even though the company is headed
by an "energetic 31-year-old general director, who was elected by
shareholders,"117 the firm faces numerous difficulties raising capital,
shedding labor, and spinning off apartments and other social services.
The general director notes that "[t]he economy of Cherepovets largely
depends on Severstal. Employment is an important issue, especially
in this time of political uncertainty."118
A firm such as Severstal, with poor firm boundaries, massive
overemployment, and increasingly obsolete equipment, cannot drum
up much outside investor interest even with a relatively benign corporate governance reputation. 119 "[O]utside bidders for the stake would
be taking a risk by buying into a company with a closed management
style."120 Recently, the regional office of the State Property Committee decided to sell its ten percent share in the company, but the only
likely bidder is the insider management whose current share is a ••well
guarded secret." 121 Most likely, acquiring the ten percent would boost
management from its current majority control position to over seventy-five percent, at which point it would have "absolute control" 122
of the company, free of many protections for minority shareholders.123
116 See Stephanie Baker-Said, Steel :Z..fill Begins Crawl to Productivity, Moscow Tlllles,
July 2, 1997, in Lexis, News Library, Mostms file; see also Neela Banerjee, Russian FlfDl
Controls Elections, Profits by Buying City's Media, Dallas Morning News, June 15, 1997, at
16A ("[A]lmost everyone works for the steelmaker or has a relati\'e who does.").
117 Baker-Said, supra note 116.
118 Patrick N"mneman, Growth in China and India; Turmoil in Russia, New Steel, Aug.
1997, at 76, 77 (reporting on discussion of vast employment rolls of Russian steel company
at 1997 Steel Survival Strategies conference).
119 According to one firm analyst. "'Severstal does not have a track record of either
cheating investors or treating them fairly...• They are not interested in the capital markets, but at the same time they don't engage in share issues or transfer pricing to the extent
that other companies do."' Brian Humphreys, State to Sell 10% Stake in Northern Steel
Giant. Moscow Tlfiles, May 12, 1999, at 11, 1999 WL 6807252 (quoting metals anaylst
Kakha Kiknavelidze).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 The insiders may secure absolute control, not just of the firm, but also of the surrounding governments. The firm's odd boundaries make it particularly vulnerable to political depredations by local and regional governments. Rather than restructure, Severstal
has defended itself by buying all of the newspapers and radio and television stations in the
region, even though they are for the most part unprofitable. Sec Banerjee, supra note 116,
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Thus, we get a preview of how poor firm boundaries can lead to potential corporate governance problems and inflict more economic
damage than simply the increased transaction costs they cause.

2.

Dominance by Insider Groups

a. Insider Control Before Privatization. Russia has a long history of control by a combination of management, labor representatives, and local government insiders. During the Soviet era, central
planning and ministry supervision disciplined insiders' decisionmaking
to some extent. Beginning with Gorbachev's reforms in the late 1980s
and Yeltsin's reforms in the early 1990s, central ministry control was
loosened without installing any outside monitor as a replacement.
Managers quickly came up with the idea that enterprises needed owners, and that they indeed were those owners.124
Before firms were privatized, they went through an intermediate
step called "corporatization," in which the enterprise was formally
created as an incorporated business unit with a separate legal identity,
a board of directors, senior management, and a notional economic
value ascribed to its assets.125 When a firm was corporatized, the state
owned 100% of its stock but central ministries lost day-to-day control.
During this preprivatization stage, boards of directors explicitly divided control among the general director who received two votes,
rank-and-file workers who received one vote, and the local and federal governments that each received a vote. 126 The employees elected
the senior management during this period,127 but employees rarely exercised their power in anything but the most nominal sense. 128 By
at 16A. These captive media then backed company-sponsored candidates who captured all
of the city's elected positions and then "voted to cut Severstal's property taxes retroactively for all of 1996, despite budget shortfalls. The decision saved the company several
million dollars in taxes." Id.
124 As Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse recount:
The Russian general director is similar in authority to the chief executive officer (CEO) of a capitalist company .... In the past, a Soviet ministry could
hire and fire him. Once Gorbachev removed cabinet supervision from the top
managers of [the general director's] plant, the only formal authority over his
enterprise was a distant state bureaucracy that was spinning out of control, and
the now independent, authoritarian [general director] could do what he
pleased. [The general director] was probably tempted to treat the company as
his personal property. This process has been called spontaneous privatization.
Blasi et al., supra note 57, at 33.
125 See id. at 40.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 91.
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cooperating with or intimidating the workers, managers positioned
themselves to keep control of the firm at privatization.129

b. Management-Employee Buyout Disguised as Stock Ownership. Russia's mass privatization program from 1992 to 1994 transferred more than 15,000 medium and large state-owned firms to
private ownership130 with "a speed that is quite unprecedented in the
post-Communist world.,, 131 These firms employed over seventeen
million workers and managers and included the bulk of the Russian
industrial core,132 except for a few key categories of firms, including
energy, defense, and infrastructure.133 By 1996, when the big wave of
privatization was over, 77.2% of medium and large state enterprises
were privatized, accounting for 88.3 % of industrial output.134
At the time of privatization, most issuers chose an option
whereby a majority of their shares went to three groups of insiders:
issuer management, the issuer labor force, and regional governmental
agencies. The government decision to give firms this option involved
following the path of least political resistance by granting a continuing
stake to each group that had had significant power running the firm
prior to privatization. Although the mass privatization used vouchers
and formally created open stock ownership, the program "was basically a management-employee buyout program because of its preferential treatment of managers and workers.,, 135 After insiders bought
129 See, e.g., id. (stating that trade union officials were sometimes kept on board of directors for "window dressing," and describing instance of silent intimidation by managers);
see also Mileusnic, supra note 46, at I (describing how Russian company directors "intimidate employees who side with" foreign investors).
130 See Blasi et al., supra note 57, at 192 tbl.3 (discussing slight discrepancies in number
of firms privatized and citing sources); World Bank, supra note 17, at 55 (estimating that
insiders acquired around two-thirds of shares in 15,000 privatized firms).
131 Frydman et al., supra note 24, at 189.
132 In 1988, medium (more than 200 employees) and large (more than 1000 employees)
enterprises accounted for about 95% of employees and production in Russia. See Blasi ct
al., supra note 57, at 25.
133 In 1995, a few large, rich firms, such as oil and gas companies, were privatized
through a controversial "shares for loans" program that handed shares over to a number of
financial-industrial groups controlled by new private tycoons. See infra text accompan}ing
notes 215-17 (discussing "shares-for-loans" scheme).
134 See Blasi et al., supra note 57, at 25-26. The totals now are higher: 4600 mainly small
and medium enterprises underwent some form of privatization in 1996. See European
Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., Transition Report 1997, at 195 (1997).
135 World Bank, supra note 17, at 55. Insiders had several privatization options. About
one-quarter of enterprises chose option one, which gave minority employee ownership for
free. About three-quarters of firms chose option two, which allowed managers and workers to acquire 51 % of the firm for extremely low prices (and therefore to take formal
control of the firm). A third option attracted only two percent. This option allowed a
management buyout on the promise of reaching particular restructuring targets. See Blasi
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shares, each citizen could bid, using vouchers they were given, for
some of the remaining shares at auctions. Immediately after privatization, insiders undertook additional share purchases on the open market and typically ended up owning about two-thirds of the shares of
firms. On average, managers owned nine percent and workers about
fifty-six percent. 136 Outsiders used vouchers to buy about twenty to
thirty percent, split between investment funds and individual investors. Tue government retained the remainder of shares, and, even
more importantly, it often retained control of the land on which enterprises were located.137
Postprivatization, senior managers used numerous mechanisms to
thwart the power of employees and outsiders and to maintain control.
These mechanisms included, for example, keeping share registries
locked up in their offices and refusing to acknowledge ownership by
people they disfavored, threatening to fire workers who sold shares to
outsiders, and reducing the power (as well as the financial claims
noted earlier) of outsider shareholders by means of stock dilutions.138
Managers also provided little or no disclosure about the business operations or finances of their firms. Even voucher investment funds,
which are the most aggressive and informed outside shareholders,
often cannot get rudimentary information about the firms in which
they hold shares139 and instead "resort to spying on their own companies. "140 Thus, managers did not acquire a majority of shares during
the initial privatization, but they locked up nearly unshakeable control.141 Workers, who did acquire majority shareownership, did not
et al., supra note 57, at 41 (describing three plans for transfer of shares at privatization,
each of which transferred "40 to 51 percent of ownership to managers and employees").
136 See Frydman et al., supra note 24, at 189; World Bank, supra note 17, at 55.
137 See Larsen, supra note 40, at III ("Many companies seeking to get a clearer title to
their land still face stiff resistance from regional authorities who see land ownership as a
source of power in dealing with local enterprises ...."). This is reported to be a declining
problem in the big cities but is still serious in the rest of the country.
138 See Galuszka & Kranz, supra note 35, at 60 ("(N)ew tricks ... range from diluting
the ownership stake of investors to such simple ploys as erasing the names of outside inves·
tors from computerized shareholder lists."); Carole Landry, Russia's Communist Bosses
Are On the Way Out, Agence France-Presse, Dec. 15, 1994, 1994 WL 9647596 ("Old-guard
managers, who supported privatisation in exchange for assurances they would keep their
jobs and full array of perks, are desperately fighting back. Some managers physically
threaten challengers at shareholder meetings, rig shareholder votes or illegally change corporate charters." (citing Prof. Andrei Shleifer and Dmitry Vasilyev)).
139 See Mooney, supra note 83 (noting that, according to one analysis, "'[t)here is a need
for transparency and disclosure because accurate information is hard to come by. Compa·
nies frequently hold their shareholder meetings in remote places like Siberia."' (quoting
Lee Wolosky)).
140 Frydman et al., supra note 24, at 204.
141 A reporter notes:
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achieve anything like a "workers' democracy." 142 Instead, they remained locked in an uneasy arrangement with management, often
able to block restructuring but not able to seize control.143 Among
the many reasons for continued employment of redundant labor, managers sometimes kept employees to prevent them from selling shares
to outsiders.144 If managers fired workers, they could no longer use
the threat of job loss to deter share sales.
c. The Persistent Pattern of Initial Privatization. The effects of
the initial privatization are persistent. Insider ownership is declining
slightly (dropping from sixty-five percent in 1993 to about fifty-six
percent in 1995),145 but the problems of majority insider ownership
remain pervasive. By 1996, the typical board contained four managers, one state representative, and two outside shareholders.146 Because five directors were required to make decisions, the insiders and
the state representative always could prevail, if they cooperated.147
The 1996 corporate law includes measures that respond precisely
to the problem of insider domination that emerged from the initial
privatization scheme and from the immediate postprivatization enterprise behavior.148 For example, the new corporate law improves the
position of minority outside shareholders by mandating cumulative
Most Russian enterprises are still run by red directors-former communists
who stack their boards with old-regime subordinates or cronies, bully workers
into selling their shares back to management. and deny outside shareholders
access to their books, boardrooms, and shop floors. Many consolidate control
of their companies by issuing large blocks of new shares to company insiders,
often at bargain-basement prices.
Kranz, supra note 93, at 60.
142 A reporter notes:
[I]f [directors] see outside shareholders trying to get hold of their company,
these managers often shout down their proposals at meetings, intimidate employees who side with them and hold tight to the board-which is often still
considered a Soviet-era workers' council....
Most employee shareholders, ... are still passive and exert little influence over
corporate governance because they are underrepresented on company
boards ....
Mileusnic, supra note 46, at I.
143 See, e.g., Blasi et al., supra note 57, at 147 (describing stockholders' meeting where
workers used their votes to prevent holding company from gaining influence in Lcbedinsk
Ore Processing Company).
144 See id. at 135, 147.
145 See World Bank, supra note 17, at 55.
146 See Blasi et al., supra note 57, at 99.
147 See id.
148 See id. at 98 (describing provisions of 1996 corporate Jaw); Black & Kraakman, supra
note 108, at 1924 (describing problem of entrenched insider control).
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voting. 149 As a result, outside owners of share blocks are increasingly
able to get themselves elected to the board of directors, despite resistance by insiders to the cumulative voting rule. 150 In tum, Roman
Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski show that outsider representation
on the board has had some positive effect on firm performance.1s1
Also, significant transactions in which insiders are interested are supposed to be approved by the outside shareholders. Nevertheless, insiders have found numerous mechanisms to circumvent the
protections offered by the 1996 reforms and to continue effecting non
pro rata distributions.152
d. The Enduring Cost of Insider Ownership. To summarize, we
observe three interrelated failures in Russia that are associated with
the initial structure of insider ownership and control. First, the three
groups of insiders have been unable to work together to operate their
firms in a way that would maximize even their own joint benefit. They
have tended to view their shares more as control rights than as financial instruments. Each group has, despite privatization, continued to
focus primarily on how the firm could be run in a way that would most
benefit that group directly. Managers extract extensive perquisites
and sweetheart business deals for themselves and associates. Labor
ensures continued employment of redundant workers. Regional government entities continue receiving public services for the community.153 Each group goes along to get along; it agrees to meet the
other groups' minimal demands in exchange for getting its direct ben149

See Blasi et al., supra note 57, at 99 (describing details of cumulative voting law).
See id. at 99. But see id. at 148 ("Most of the companies do not ... use cumulative
voting, and the number of blockholders' seats on the board does not reflect the size of their
ownership stakes."); id. at 201 tbl.9 (indicating that 39% of companies used cumulative
voting in 1996).
151 See Frydman et. al., supra note 24, at 214-18.
152 While new bills keep being introduced to close loopholes, they do not appear to be
effective. Thus,
(C]ritics said the legislation fails to attack the real problem-insider dealingand doubt anything but better information disclosure requirements and an understanding of basic ethics will help the situation. In Russia, company directors and managers are routinely accused of insider dealing, which includes
everything from accepting bribes to act against their company's interests to
selling assets or shares to relatives or friends.
Daigle, supra note 2. Insider dealing is not limited to management, but also includes deals
in favor of local governments and labor. See, e.g., Stephanie Baker-Said, Watchdog Gives
Nod to MGTS Floatation, Moscow Times, Apr. 22, 1998, available in Lexis, News Library,
Mostms file ("Moscow City Telephone Network, or MGTS, is planning to increase its authorized capital by 50 percent, handing the shares over to a single shareholder linked to the
Moscow city government for next to nothing.").
153 In Moscow, "[t]his cozy relationship is multiplied a thousand times. According to
many business people, [Moscow Mayor] Luzhkov used property as leverage. The property
150
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e:fit. But these insider deals ignore the cumulative effects on the value
of the firm for themselves and for outsider shareholders.154 One Russian fund manager notes that "the majority of directors still fear loss
of control to an outside investor and have not yet recognized that a
smaller piece of a growing pie is more valuable than ownership of a
dead enterprise."155
Second, the three groups run the firm in a way that is particularly
disadvantageous to outsider shareholders.156 The primitive state of
the Russian legal system and the general lack of corporate transparency mean that outside shareholders gain no real protection from
the fiduciary duties nominally placed on managers and only weak protection from procedural rules designed to police interested transactions.157 Majority insiders usually can crush what otherwise would be
the only meaningful constraints on their behavior: the ability of outsiders to vote out the board and the threat of a hostile takeover.1ss
was leased for a nominal sum, but the city also made unwritten demands not in the lease:
to plant trees, rebuild a hospital, pave a highway." Hoffman, supra note 42. at Al.
154 One reporter notes:
[T]he reluctance of many directors to use the stock market to their benefit is a
paradox: After all, an overwhelming majority of directors managed to grab
sizable portions of equity in their companies during the wild privatization years
of 1993 to 1994, usually by buying out swathes of shares with the help of cheap
bank loans through a highly abused process known as closed subscription.
Were directors to understand the virtue of shareholder value, they could help
make themselves even richer.
Peach, supra note 2
155 Neither CEOs nor Red Directors, The Managers of Russia's Pri\'atized Industrial
Frrms, Russia Express Briefing, Dec. 9, 1996, 1996 WL 8619171.
156 Commenting on the aluminum smelting industry, one reporter suggests that
Since they aren't now looking to attract capital through share issues, the com·
panies' directors are not concerned about plummeting stock prices, and don't
really care what the market thinks about them. Aluminum shares last traded
actively in 1994 and 1995, when various insiders were trying to establish control of smelters during the privatization process.
Whitehouse, supra note 16.
157 Cf. Stefan Wagstyl, Region's Fmancial Transparency Uneven: Corporate Governance, Fm. T!Illes (London), Sept. 24, 1999, World Economy & Fmance, at 28 (stating that:
A critical role is played in the economy by laws affecting pledges, bankruptcy
and company formation because these protect the position of creditors and
outside shareholders vis-a-vis majority shareholders and.for managers. In \irtually every country in the region, there are complaints about securing redress
under pledge, mortgage and bankruptcy laws. A common concern is about the
effectiveness of courts to produce rapid judgments. Justice delayed is often
justice denied.).
158 According to the 1997 EBRD Transition Report:
In over 65% of Russia's 18,000 privatised medium-sized and large firms management and employees have majority ownership, whereas non-state outsiders
control only 20% of these companies. While in the top 100 largest companies
outsiders have an ownership stake well above the average, the wide dispersion
of these shareholdings often ensures a controlling position for the manage-
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Third, the above failures inside existing firms in turn limit capital
market development, with collateral consequences for both existing
and new firms. Established firms cannot raise new capital through the
public sale of new equity, a particularly grave problem given the primitive state of banking in Russia. 159 Further, the resulting lack of vibrancy in the secondary market for insider shares means that primary
and secondary markets do not develop for the shares of new, postprivatization firms. 160 This lack of stock market vibrancy also slows
outsider purchases of employee shares and delays the resulting conversion of firms with majority insider ownership to majority outsider
ownership. The result of these three failures has been an overall lack
of much-needed restructuring. 1 61

B.

How Initial Conditions Cause Corporate Governance Failures

This Section establishes the causal links between the initial conditions just described, the corporate governance failures detailed in Part
I, and the resulting harms to the Russian economy.

1.

Peculiar Firm Boundaries and the Failure to Maximize Residuals

Poorly defined boundaries render firms with weakly constrained
and weakly incentivized management particularly susceptible to several of the five residual nonmaximization pathologies. To start, consider Pathology 1: continued operation of a value-destroying firm.
From the moment of privatization, Russia had many such firms that
ment. Insiders typically focus more on maintaining control over their firms
than on restructuring.
European Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., supra note 134, at 195.
159 See, e.g., World Bank, supra note 17, at 100 box 6.1 (describing Russian banking
reform in 1980s and 1990s).
160 See European Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., supra note 134, at 195 ("The main
source of the expansion of the private sector remains the privatisation process and the
contraction of the state sector.... The creation of de novo businesses continues to lag far
behind the pace typical for the central European countries and many newly established
businesses continue to operate in the informal economy.").
161 According to the 1997 EBRD Transition Report:
Enterprise restructuring has hitherto been achieved mainly through changes in
the product mix, shedding of labour through attrition, expanded use of unpaid
leave or reduced hours. Deeper restructuring in the form of factory shutdowns, changes in management, major reorganisations and modernisation is at
a very early stage and is constrained by, among other factors, limited access to
investment resources. Recent evidence suggests that roughly 25% of the medium-sized and large companies are engaged in serious restructuring, many of
them being members of Financial and Industrial Groups (FI Gs). About half of
the medium-sized and large companies have not as yet undertaken any meaningful restructuring.
Id.
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should have been shut down instantly.162 Because of their peculiar
boundaries, these stillborn firms made little sense as a way to match
location, assets, workers, and product mix, but they often had assets
with significant salvage value, urban land in particular. Despite the
damage they cause to social welfare, managers of such firms indulge
their personal preferences by continuing firm operations. When land
is the salvageable asset, managers can easily avoid taking the residualmaximizing decision because Russia does not have a well-developed
land market. There is, therefore, no effective way to make salient the
opportunity costs of using the land for continued firm operation.163
A similar story can be told with respect to Pathology 2, in which
potentially viable firms fail to use existing capacity efficiently. Most
Russian firms not displaying Pathology 1 are likely to display Pathology 2. Cost minimization is a necessary condition for residual maximization. By definition, what made these firms' borders peculiar was
the fact that they were not transaction cost minimizing, so by definition, firms in this second category require major restructuring. 164 Unlike the case of managers of firms in the first category, it is not selfevident why loosely constrained managers of these firms would avoid
restructuring and operate their firm in a residual nonmaximizing
way.165 However, the story told below of bargaining failures among
the insider groups suggests that, in a large number of cases, managers
may have reason to avoid restructuring, thus dooming their firms to
the long-term display of Pathology 2.
The peculiar borders of Russian firms also have made them more
prone to Pathology 3. This pathology is more likely to occur in an
enterprise encompassing an unnecessarily large number of different
activities: If the cash flow from one activity exceeds the positive net
present value projects arising out of that activity, then the managers
are likely to invest the surplus in negative net present value projects
associated \vith other firm activities. 166 If the two activities were split
into different firms, the cash flow more likely would be paid out as
162 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 23, at Al (describing company that continues to operate despite consistent net losses, and noting that such businesses are not considered bankrupt in Russia); see also supra Part I.B.1 (giving examples of value-destroying firms).
163 See Roman Frydman et al., The Privatization Process in Russia. Ukraine and the
Baltic States 71-74 (1993) (describing slow development of land markets in Russia, which
has resulted in part from 10-year moratorium on alienation of land, established in 1991).
164 See supra Part I.B.2 (giving examples of firms exhibiting Pathology 2).
165 See, e.g., Simon Clarke & Veronika Kabalina, Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise, in Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation, and Inequality 142.
151-52 (David Lane ed., 1995) (suggesting that managers' own stake should motivate them
to maximize company prosperity but identifying rent-seeking and short-term goals as factors that may temper incentive to maximize company profits).
166 See supra Part I.B.3 (giving examples).
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dividends, and investors would have the chance to fund projects with
more promising returns.
Finally, compared with outside investors facing a fragmented set
of single purpose firms, the management of an enterprise encompassing an unnecessarily large number of activities will-because of its distance from idea sources and the rigidity of internal communications
channels-likely have more difficulty finding positive net present
value projects. Thus, the peculiar boundaries of Russian firms also
aggravate the effects of Pathology 5.
2.

Insider Dominance and the Failure to Maximize Residuals
a. The Nature of the Failure and the Need for a Credible Promise. As discussed above, after privatization, most Russian firms were
majority owned by three groups of insiders: management, employees,
and regional governmental authorities.167 At first glance, this ownership pattern appears to offer many advantages and to solve several
firm-level problems. Management's large stake, typically over twenty
percent of what are often very large enterprises, should have led to a
substantial identification with the interests of shareholders, while not
being so large as to provide an insuperable barrier to takeover. The
employees' stake substantially should have helped some of the contracting problems associated with long-term employment relationships-such as encouraging asset-specific human capital investments
by employees-and should have reduced resistance to needed downsizing significantly, by offering implicit compensation through increased share value. 168 More importantly, when the stakes of the
three groups were taken together, the groups typically had a right to
receive seventy percent or more of the residuals. Thus, they had huge
incentives to agree that the firm itself should be operated in a fashion
that maximizes these residuals. Yet, the structure of ownership and
control actually has worked in the opposite direction, contributing to
the failure to maximize residuals.169
Traditionally, the choice between public and private ownership
has been seen as involving a tradeoff. Public ownership leads to a
lower cost of capital because the firm's shares can be sold for a higher
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Milica Uvalic & Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, Introduction: Creating Employee Capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe, in Privatization Surprises in li"ansition
Economies 1, 23 (Milica Uvalic & Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead eds., 1997) (offering reasons
why employees' stakes do not solve problems of control and inefficiency).
169 Irrationality may be a problem here too. In one odd report, "'one company director
who owned over 51 percent of a company ... took personal bribes of about $10,000 to push
through decisions that robbed the company of millions. Obviously, this man doesn't understand what he's doing."' Daigle, supra note 2 (quoting Konstantin Kontor).
167

168
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price due to both their liquidity and their capacity to be part of a diversified portfolio.17° Public ownership also permits a degree of
outside monitoring.171 Private ownership, however, greatly reduces
the substantial residual-reducing agency costs of management that are
associated with public firms.
At first glance, Russian firms have an ownership structure that
would appear to come close to that of a private firm, suggesting that
they should do well at maximizing their residuals. A large portion of
the shares not owned by management are owned by just two other
entities-the workers and government. This, one should expect, radically would reduce the transaction costs and collective action
problems associated with shareholder monitoring and action that
plague the public firm. But Russian firms are falling far short of maximizing their residuals, suggesting that they are suffering instead from
the worst of both worlds. They do not seem to be getting the benefits
of a private ownership structure; yet, the existence of insider control
combined with weak corporate law makes raising capital by public
sale of equity impractical and so they are not receiving the traditional
benefits of public ownership either.
The three groups of insiders have been unable to work together
to operate their firms in a way that would come close to maximizing
their own joint benefit. Their actions suggest that they continue to
view their shares more as control rights than as financial instruments.
Therefore, each group has, despite privatization, continued to focus
primarily on how each firm could be run in a way that would most
benefit the group directly. For example, managers cut side deals, labor ensures that redundant workers stay on, and regional government
extracts public services. These behaviors are major deviations from
the decisions that would maximize the firm's residuals. By failing to
cooperate through good corporate governance, the insiders fail to capture the potentially large financial value of their shares. The aggregate benefit to these three groups from these deviations is less than
the resulting diminution in the residuals. Management's gain from the
sweetheart contracts is less than the price improvement or other advantages of using the suppliers and purchasers chosen on an arms-

110 See Easterbrook & FISchel, supra note 72, at 230-31 (explaining how illiquid market
in shares provides investors with less information and with less ability to sell quickly \\ithout sacrificing price, both of which decrease their willingness to invest).
171 See Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Trrole, Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 678, 679 (1993) (ex'}Jlaining that "a firm's ownership structure influences the value of market monitoring").
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length basis. 172 Labor's gain from receiving wages and benefits beyond what they could in alternative employment is less than the reduced residuals enjoyed by the firm as a result of their continued
employment. 173 And government savings from not having to pay
other suppliers of services is less than the cost to the firm of providing
these services, which would be outside the boundaries of the firm if it
were operated in a transaction cost-minimizing fashion.
Explaining why insiders do not agree to maximize the firm's
residuals as part of an obvious Coasian bargain starts with the following observation: Under existing arrangements, the insiders receive
their benefits immediately, as they are generated by the firm's ongoing
operation. Under any kind of bargain to run the firm to maximize its
residuals, they would not receive them until later, in the form of shareholder distributions. 174 This delay is significant: A deal is not possible
unless management is able to make a credible promise that it will live
up to its end of the bargain. Otherwise, labor and local government
would be put in a position of having to give up their benefits now
without an assurance that management, which runs the corporation
from day to day, would live up to its end of the bargain: i.e., giving up
its special benefits and subsequently distributing the gains from the
overall deal as dividends.

b. The Difficulty in Making the Promise Credible. Under current conditions in Russia, management would find it almost impossible to make credible promises to live up to its end of the bargain.
i. Legal enforcement. One way that a promise can be credible
is if the promisee can use the courts easily and economically either to
112 See Whitehouse, supra note 101 (noting adverse effect of insider deals on financial
health of AvtoVAZ).
173 See Bogdan Lissovolik, Rapid Spread of Employee Ownership in the Privatized Russia, in Privatization Surprises in Transition Economies, supra note 168, at 204, 223-24 (suggesting that managers maintain overemployment levels so they will receive government
subsidies).
174 The reader may raise two questions here. The first is that the failure of insiders to
come to these deals may be related intimately to the delay because the insiders may have
very high rates of time discount, and hence receiving benefits now is preferred to receiving
larger benefits later. The answer to this, however, is that the Coasian bargain that we are
contemplating already takes such discounts into account. Efficient operation of the firm
contemplates that the residuals be discounted to present value.
The second question concerns whether an insider could avoid the delay problem by
selling her shares to others. But this does not make the problems associated with delay go
away; the buyer instead must suffer them. If delay also implies uncertainty as to whether
the gain will ever in fact be received, the buyer will pay commensurately Jess for the shares,
and so in this regard, the insider is just as badly off as she would be had she held onto the
shares.
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gain the promisor's compliance or to obtain damages. 175 For a number of reasons, labor and local government are unlikely to be able to
do so. For a promise's credibility to be based on the availability of
court enforcement, there must be a legal obligation on the part of the
promisor. As a formal matter, Russian managers may be bound to
maximize residuals and distribute them pro rata even without an explicit deal with other insiders, but this is not clear as a matter of law.
The Russian corporate code nominally imposes on the management of
joint stock companies the obligation to act in the interests of the company reasonably and in good faith. 176 The language of this obligation
is similar to the statutory provisions for fiduciary duties under U.S.
corporate law,177 which are interpreted as banning e>.1ensive perquisites178 and prohibiting transactions between the corporation and
management or its associates, unless the transactions offer the firm
terms as good as can be obtained in an arms-length deai.119 There is
essentially no judicial gloss, however, to affirm that this language
would be interpreted in the same way in Russia.
The second step is the actual availability of court enforcement.
Russian law again nominally provides for a form of derivative suit for
damages in the event of a breach of management's statutory obligations.180 Even if we assume that as a formal matter management is
obliged to behave in the fashion contemplated by the Coasian bargain
hypothesized here, labor and local government are unlikely to be able
to use the courts to stop violations of that obligation. 181 According to
175 See Chong Ju Choi et al., A Note on Countertrade: Contractual Uncertainty and
rransaction Governance in Emerging Economies, 30 J. Int'l Bus. Stud. 189, 195 (1999}
(describing most effective enforcement mechanism for promises \\ith different ex ante
conditions).
176 See Federal Law on Joint Stock Companies, Federal Law No. 208-FZ. art. 71(1)
(Russ.) (Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarrassova trans., 1997), reprinted in Bernard S.
Black et al., Guide to the Russian Law on Joint Stock Companies III-1, Ill-59 (1998).
177 See, e.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 8.30(a) (Supp. 1998-99) (offering model statute that intposes obligations on directors to act "in good faith, and ••. in a manner the
director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation"}; see also id.
commentary at 8-178 (noting that majority of jurisdictions have adopted \'ersion of model
statute).
178 See William L. Cary & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations 689-700 (7th ed. 1995) (collecting cases in which executive compensation was challenged but noting difficulties of prevailing in such challenges).
179 See id. at 673 (noting that self-interested transactions in which corporations deal \\ith
management must be "on fair terms" and "in the corporation's interest").
180 See Federal Law No. 208-FZ, art 71(1 ), (5), reprinted in Black et al., supra note 176,
at ill-59 to ill-60 (providing for suits by company or shareholders against directors and
management for negligent actions). The Russian joint stock company law makes no pro\ision for shareholders to receive injunctive relief against management See id.
181 See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 83 (stating that '"[t]ransfer pricing already is against
the law in Russia. However, it is an example of a larger problem. The body of law is not
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Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, "[i]n Russia ... courts function
slowly if at all, some judges are corrupt, and many are Soviet-era holdovers who neither understand business nor care to learn. Better
judges and courts will emerge only over several decades, as the old
judges die or retire."182
Another possible way of gaining managerial compliance while relying less on the court system is through legal regulation of the corporation's own process of transaction authorization.183 Russian law has
procedural rules designed to make less likely the authorization of
transactions in which management or a major shareholder is interested and that are disadvantageous to the corporation. These rules
require that such transactions be approved by the vote of a majority of
those directors who are not interested in the transaction or, in certain
cases, by a disinterested majority share vote. 184 Special procedural
rules apply also to the approval of very large transactions.1 85 The theory is that these rules require much less court intervention to be effective because the factual determination of whether or not there has
been compliance is sufficiently simple and clear as to make the rules
nearly "self-enforcing."186
In the end, however, these rules may not be much help either.187
To show that management or a major shareholder is interested in a
transaction requires proving that it is associated in some specified way
with the other party to the transaction. A general lack of transparency concerning who owns the shares of, or has managerial positions in, the corporations involved makes this proof difficult. 188 Even
that bad, but it lacks reliable means of enforcement, legal systems, regulatory regimes' ...."(quoting Lee Wolosky)).
182 Black & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 1914.
183 See id. at 1915-16.
184 See Federal Law No. 208-FZ, art. 83, reprinted in Black et al., supra note 176, at III·
69 to III-70 (requiring that some transactions by interested directors be approved by ma·
jority of noninterested directors or by shareholders).
185 See id. arts. 78-79, reprinted in Black et al., supra note 176, at III-66 to III-67 (requir·
ing approval by all directors or by three-fourths majority of shareholders to conduct certain "major transactions").
186 See, e.g., Black & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 1916 (describing model corporate
governance rules that incorporate "bright-line rules" easily enforced by judges).
187 See id. at 1918 (noting that "there are limits to what a self-enforcing corporate law
can accomplish").
188 In theory, interested persons are required to disclose this information to the com·
pany's board, inspector, and auditors. See Federal Law No. 208-FZ, art. 82, reprinted in
Black et al., supra note 176, at III-68 to III-69. However, there is no obvious incentive for
such persons to comply with this provision. Even if they do, it is not clear that the information would become available to anyone who, possessing it, might act to challenge the trans·
action for lack of compliance with the approval procedures. It was the experience of the
authors, in connection with an interested transaction involving one of Russia's largest oil
companies, that this information was not available, either because the insiders did not com-
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when owners or managers are identified, it is hard to know whether
the voting results in fact conform with the procedural requirements, in
part because of similar transparency problems and in part because of
difficulties in determining who voted which way.189
ii. Reputation. Another way that a promise can be credible is
where the promisor has a prior reputation for keeping its promises in
situations in which legal enforcement is difficult and the nonlegal consequences-other than damage to reputation-would not have been
expected to be great.19° Such a promisor is unlikely to breach the
promise in question because doing so debases its reputation, which is
costly.191 The problem in Russia is that in the few years since privatization, the management of the typical corporation has not had the
time to develop such a reputation, either through informal networks
or formal verification institutions,192 at least with respect to promises
of this magnitude.
While the same management team may have been in place for a
significant time prior to privatization, the team, and all those with
whom it dealt, had been subject to strict ministerial supervision. Because of this supervision, the need for credible promises was lesser
and the non reputation-related negative consequences of breaching
the promises that were made were greater. Also, most promises were
made with persons within the context of an ongoing course of dealing,
but those networks have been disrupted in the new post-socialist
economy.
An additional problem here is that the promise that management
needs to make is contrary to the norm for managerial behavior in
ply with Article 82 or because the company did not make the information public. See
supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text {discussing Sidanko).
189 It was also the experience of the authors in connection \\ith a Sidanko transaction
that the public records of the directors' meeting and the shareholders' meeting at which an
interested transaction was approved did not reveal who voted for and against the
transaction.
190 See Choi et al., supra note 175, at 192 ("[T]he value of a reputation for fair trading,
not restricted by any legal requirement other than sanctions of social nature, pro'<ides the
basis for confidence in future performance, promotes cooperation, and thus creates networks and clusters of relational or implicit contracts."); Ronald Dore, Goodwill and the
Spirit of Market Capitalism, 34 Brit J. Soc. 459, 463-64 (1983) {discussing obligated relational contracting in Japan).
191 See Roger C. Vergin & M.W. Qoronfleh, Corporate Reputation and the Stock Market, Bus. Horizons, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 19, 25 (noting that positive corporate reputation increases corporations ability to "obtain[] capital more easily and at better rates"). Vergin
and Qoronfleh also note that prior financial performance, including 10-year annual return
to shareholders, is a critical determinant of corporate reputation. See id. at 22.
192 See generally Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing 'li"ansactions, fr/
Geo. LJ. 2225 (1999).
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Russia. A person who makes a particular promise that he has not
made before, but the promised behavior is the norm, is likely to be
credible if she has fulfilled other promises that conform to the norm
with respect to other kinds of behavior over time. Such a person may
be viewed as a "regular fellow" or a "straight shooter." Where the
behavior promised runs contrary to the norm, such a reputation is of
no help.
m. Hostages. A third way a promise can be made credible is
where the promisor gives the promisee a "hostage" that can be taken
by the promisee if the promisee feels that there has been a breach. 193
The ideal hostage is something that is worth much less to the promisee
than the promisor. A firm's plant might serve this kind of hostage
function if it were vulnerable to certain kinds of labor actions, such as
sit-ins. Labor is poorly organized in Russia, however, and so collective action problems make it unlikely that it would be able to use the
plant in this fashion. 194 Such actions also likely would be repressed by
governmental authorities. Any promise by management to waive its
rights to such governmental assistance would have its own credibility
problems.

iv. The need for ex post verification. None of these ways of
making a promise credible will work unless there is some method of
ascertaining whether the promise has been kept or not. This is another serious obstacle to the parties' making a Coasian bargain requiring management to use its control to maximize residuals and then
193 See Choi et al., supra note 175, at 199 ("Where neither contracts nor trust provide a
viable institutional force of enforcement, hostages can impose mutual commitment in an
interlinked or reciprocal fashion. We have argued that trust, contracts and hostages arc
seen as alternative mechanisms of exchange .... "); see also id. at 194 (describing countcrtrade, buyback, and production sharing agreements as hostage-taking approaches, in which
one party pays for asset that remains in control of other party); Dalia Marin & Monika
Schnitzer, Tying Trade Flows: A Theory of Countertrade with Evidence, 85 Am. Econ.
Rev. 1047, 1049 (1995) (describing countertrade agreements with assets as hostages).
194 See John Thornhill, Russian Unions Struggling for Their Workers' Trust, Fin. Post
(Toronto), Oct. 26, 1995, available in Lexis, World Library, Natpst file (noting that:
A recent nationwide survey of 2,000 Russians by the University of Strathclyde
in Scotland revealed widespread distrust of trade union representatives. Only
16% of the respondents who were trade union members said they trusted their
national leaders to look after their interests.

On paper, at least, the official trade union movement has a strong base from
which to begin the reconstruction ....
But the report concluded this strength was largely illusory, given the official
unions' compromised past and the slowness of its leaders to adapt to new
circumstances.).
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distribute them pro rata.195 In terms of ex post verification, management is in the same position making this promise to labor and government as it would be making this promise to any noncontrolling outside
shareholder. The whole apparatus of modem auditing and accounts is
designed to provide a reasonable assessment of the amount of residuals that have been generated, to identify the amount of spending for
management compensation and perquisites, to ferret out corporate
transactions in which management is interested, to identify which investors receive how much in distributions, and to highlight outright
theft. Application of this apparatus to Russian corporations is in its
infancy and so most transactions remain far from transparent.196

c. The Lack of Strong Capital Markets. Along with the inability of management to make credible promises, the absence of strong
capital markets (itself a result of widespread corporate governance
failures) frustrates the parties' intentions to make a Coasian deal to
maximize residuals. Even if workers were able to obtain what they
believe to be a credible promise from management, they would have
great difficulty selling for cash today their rights to receive in the future the benefits of the deal. This is an important additional complication because the desperate living conditions of many Russian workers,
combined with a belief that the future could not be worse and might
be better, may give them a strong positive time preference-an illustration of the difficulty of making social welfare evaluations of decisions involving the allocation of resources over time when capital
markets fail. If discounting to present value is done at the interest
rate implied by the strong positive time preference of highly creditconstrained workers, managers may be running firms in ways that suddenly appear far more efficient.
195 See Choi et al., supra note 175, at 191 (noting that enforcement costs, including measurement costs, are principal barriers to Coasian bargaining, especially in international
context where "the level of complexity and uncertainty tends to be particularly severe").
196 For example, consider the following account
(A] barrier to action by outsiders is the information vacuum that prevails in
many insider-held companies. They all try to look poor. The only real books
are in the director's safe, or his head. It's hard even to know which firms arc
worth taking over. Once a successful bid is made, one Russian consultant described the takeover itself in virtually military terms: Advance spies must
learn which safes and computers hold the key files. On takeover day, armed
guards must secure all of these within minutes or the data, and the cash behind
them, will simply vanish. All physical assets must be nailed down or nothing
will be left but an empty shell. These are little details foreign investors don't
always understand, noted the consultant
Dolan, supra note 90, at 10.
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d. Applicability to Different Pathologies. Understanding the
bargaining dynamics among competing inside owners of privatized
Russian firms helps explain the widespread incidence in Russia of
Pathologies 2 and 3: the failure to use existing capacity efficiently and
the misinvestment of internally generated cash flows. 197 The preference of labor shareholders to retain redundant workers rather than
maximize residuals leads directly to Pathology 2. There are two ways
that the firm can keep employment high in the short run. One is to
produce more output than would be called for if the firm set marginal
cost equal to marginal revenue. The other is to produce this level of
output using a combination of inputs that includes more labor than
would the cost-minimizing input combination. Both decisions involve
failures to use existing capacity as efficiently as possible, and both reduce residuals as a consequence. The labor shareholders' desire to
retain redundant workers also leads to Pathology 3. 198 While firm investment in negative net present value projects is not necessary for
employment to be maximized in the current period, it is necessary for
employment to be maximized in the future, assuming that the new
investment does not embody a radically labor-saving new technology.
This is true whether the investment replaces worn out existing capacity or represents an actual expansion of capacity. Labor's interest
here parallels managers' personal interest in running as large an enterprise as possible, everything else being equal.
The bargaining dynamics story is not as helpful in explaining Pathology 1. The residual-maximizing change necessary for firms displaying Pathology 1 is to close them immediately. As we have seen in
Part I, to the extent that an unreformable, value-destroying firm continues operating because of corporate governance problems, it is because the firm has cash reserves (unlikely in Russia) or salvageable
assets. 199 The Coasian deal here would be to close the firm as soon as
these assets could be sold. There is no time delay requiring a credible
promise on the part of management, and hence none of the problems
discussed above should block the deal.
How then can the existence of firms displaying Pathology 1 be
explained? One possibility is that such firms do not exist-i.e., that
Pathology 1 is an empty set. The anecdotal evidence presented here,
however, suggests that this is not the case.200 Another possibility is
that title to these salvageable assets, at least in the case of land, is not
See supra Parts I.B.2, I.B.3.
See supra Part l.B.3.
199 See supra Part l.B.1.
200 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 23, at Al (describing Russian engine factory with
large losses and quoting analyst stating that continued operation of factory '"makes no
197
198
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as clear as we have portrayed it; in particular, it might be that local
authorities have the power to block land sales independent of the
powers they have as shareholders.201 If so, the needed reform is in
property law and public law, not improved corporate governance. Yet
another possibility is that the market for such salvageable assets is
extremely illiquid due to severe limitations in capital markets in Russia generally. Thus, existing Pathology 1 firms gradually will be shut
down as buyers are found who will pay full value for the assets, but
this process will take considerable time.202 If that is the case, the initial conditions explain the problem not by their direct effects on the
Pathology 1 firms, but by their contribution to the failure of corporate
governance in Russia generally with that failure,s attendant deadening
of Russian capital markets. Fmally, Coasian deals may not be made in
Pathology 1 firms because of the perception of bias among firm employees. Labor may believe that the redundant jobs it wishes to save
are worth more to it than is really the case. The shareholder distribution that labor would receive upon sale of the salvageable asset then
would not seem to labor to be worth the loss of these jobs. If this is
the case, however, it would form an additional (or alternative) e:-..-planation for the failure of the Coasian bargain in the cases of firms displaying Pathologies 2 and 3 as well.
The failed Coasian bargain story also does not e:-..-plain Pathologies 4 and 5 very well. These pathologies involve failures of suitability
and capability, not conscious decisions by managers to put their personal interests above that of firm residual maximization. In essence,
managers of firms displaying these pathologies are doing as well as
they can, but a firm with less risk-averse or more imaginative managers could do better.203 The problem is thus not the result of competing insiders unable to make a Coasian bargain. The social welfare
effects of these failures would be corrected either by replacing the
incumbent managers or by assuring that there are other venues for
implementing the positive net present value projects being rejected or
sense'" in "'economic terms"' (quoting factory director Boris N. Peshkov)); SurO\\iecki,
supra note 21, at 32 (providing examples of firms exhibiting Pathology 1).
201 See Larsen, supra note 40, at
("Most of Russia's ••• privatized firms ••• do not
even have a clear lease agreement Instead .•. city officials [have] a big say in how the
land is used and ... companies [have] few rights to sublet, sell or redevelop.").
202 See supra Part I.B.1.a (discussing relationship of corporate governance and other
factors to when value-destroying firms close).
203 See supra Parts LB.4, I.BS. Outside shareholder pressure is no help here. See Jack,
supra note 14, at 21 ("Profitable companies do exist \vithin the country, even if they prefer
to keep a low profile to avoid unnecessary attention from the tax authorities or extortion
gangs. But with less than a 51 per cent stake in a business, an investor has no influence in
how it is run.").

m
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unrecognized by these managers. The failings here are in the market
for corporate control and the market to provide capital for new firms.
Thus, again, the initial conditions help explain Pathologies 4 and 5 not
directly but by their contribution to the failure of corporate governance in Russia generally and the attendant deadening of Russian capital markets.

3.

Insider Dominance and Non Pro Rata Distributions

Initial conditions in the form of insider dominance also can help
explain the massive failure of Russian firms to distribute their residuals pro rata to their investor owners. The primitive state of the Russian legal system and the general lack of corporate transparency mean
that outside shareholders gain no real protection from the fiduciary
duties nominally placed on managers and only weak protection from
procedural rules designed to police interested transactions. Privatization, as we have seen, resulted in most firms having the insiders in the
majority. This crushes what would otherwise be the only remaining
meaningful constraints on these insiders' behavior: the ability of outsiders to vote out the board and the threat of hostile takeover.204
Initial conditions also play a role, though more indirectly, in the
non pro rata distributions by firms in which the insiders have less than
a majority of shares but managers still control the firm. In theory,
these managers would at least be subject to being thrown out by the
vote of the majority outsiders or as a result of a hostile tender offer.
Shareholder votes have significant collective action problems associated with them, however,2°5 and as for hostile tender offers, the same
story applies here as discussed just above. The initial conditions and
their effect on corporate governance among Russian firms have done
severe damage to the creation of vital capital markets generally. Thus,
no effective market for corporate control has developed, and the hostile takeover check against non pro rata distributions by majority outsider-owned firms is a chimera.
204 Where insiders did not start out with unassailable majority control, they still had
working control, which they often later used to attain majority status. This was frequently
accomplished through discounted sales to affiliates. See Mooney, supra note 83 ("Lack of
evenhanded treatment in the private sales of corporate securities is another roadblock to
outside investment. ... 'Companies often sell securities in private placements at belowmarket prices to participants in subsidiaries of the issuer."' (quoting Lee Wolosky)).
205 See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 52628 (1990) (noting that rarity of successful proxy contests, difficulty for shareholders to become informed, and relatively small gains to be derived from action lead most shareholders
to choose "rational apathy" in voting); Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial
Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 485, 486-87 (1994) (highlighting "ineffectiveness of shareholder voting as a control device").
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It is worth considering the other causal factors of non pro rata
distributions as well, and here the governance failure typology is quite
useful. For example, of all the pathologies, Pathology 6, diversion of
claims, is perhaps most amenable to traditional law reform efforts, at
least in some of the pathology's forms. Perhaps registering transfers
of shares could be centralized in a public or quasi-public institution
rather than being left to the whims of individual firm managers. Particular loopholes in corporate law, such as those regarding convertible
bonds, can be tightened; standards of review in bankruptcies can be
adjusted. But even here, when so much is at stake, insiders may be
able to invent ever more subtle diversion mechanisms. For example,
many of the procedural protections available to shareholders depend
on identifying outside disinterested owners and require a majority of
their votes for important changes in corporate structure. Recent proposals attempt to strengthen these key protections.206 But insiders
have proven adept at obscuring the identity of owners and evading
these procedural protections \vith ostensibly outside owners actually
controlled by insiders.
Pathology 7, diversion of assets, is not as amenable to simple law
reform efforts, even assuming that it became easier for shareholders
to obtain judgments and enforce them. Even the Delaware Chancery
Court, presumably the most sophisticated court in the world for detecting breaches of the duty of loyalty, has a difficult time separating
out management decisions that are legitimately taken to increase
residuals, but have the incidental effect of disproportionately benefiting insiders from management decisions primarily motivated by a
management desire to effect a non pro rata distribution.201 It will be a
long time before Russian courts are likely to achieve Delaware's level
of competence. As for the more blatant examples of non pro rata
distributions, they are usually criminal and implicate a broad array of
institutional and legal deficiencies in Russia. These deficiencies include the refusal of local officials to recognize, in their role as enforcers of property rights, decisions of legitimate corporate processes
when these decisions run contrary to the desires of incumbent
managers.208

206 See Jeanne Whalen, FSC's Vasiliyev Soldiers On Amid Dismissal Rumors, Moscow
TlID.es, Dec. 5, 1998, 1998 WL 11691750 (noting proposed "amendments to dose loopholes
in the Law on Joint Stock Companies and a draft Law on Affiliated Persons that would
closely regulate the actions of majority shareholders").
207 See, e.g., Lewis D. Solomon et aL, Corporations Law and Policy 748 (4th ed. 1998).
20s See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 60-64 (discussing Segezhabumprom).
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Trends in Corporate Control

Dynamics of Initial Ownership Patterns

The original allocation of shares at the time of privatization is not
a sustainable ownership pattern over time. Many firms already have
been taken over completely by one group of insiders, usually the managers, who purchase the shares of the other insiders. This is a predictable result because the multiple groups of insiders are unable to make
joint wealth-maximizing agreements. When managers take complete
control, they can operate the corporate assets more as if the assets
were their sole private property. This is a more stable ownership pattern, and it represents a social gain because the managers are more
motivated to put assets to their first best uses.
The management control equilibrium is still far from ideal, however, and its shortcomings represent large continued failings in the
Russian system of corporate governance. First, the deals necessary to
buy out the other insiders are not easy to make because management
itself has no ready access to capital. Often, their aims are achieved by
extralegal means. Thus, the new equilibrium will take considerable
time to reach and often does not put assets, at least immediately after
the ownership restructuring, in the hands of the persons most capable
of using them. 209 The stakes are especially large because these assets
include control over cash flows that the managers often cannot invest
sensibly within their own firms, but capital market failures mean cash
flows are denied to other entrepreneurs who could make better use of
them. These failures, as we have seen, stem from the continued ability
of insiders to divert wealth from the remaining outside shareholders,
which makes raising capital through public sales of equity by any firm
virtually impossible. Given the paucity of other sources of capital,
many promising investment opportunities go unfunded. Moreover,
the absence of outside investor voice in the affairs of the firm may
mean that it is not run efficiently even to the extent that doing so is
now in the best interests of the management insiders. These managers
are often still holdovers from the Communist era and would be able to
act more in their own and society's best interests if prodded by more
market-oriented outsiders, but their continued desire to engage in non
pro rata distribution makes such consciousness-raising advice inadvisable to obtain.
Early empirical work suggests that the greatest improvement in
corporate performance in Russia comes when firms have substantial
outside ownership and those owners place outside directors on the
209

See Black et al., supra note 1, at 1763.
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board.210 This observation may be causally backward, in that outsiders tend to invest in the best firms, particularly those that are generating sufficient positive cash flow that payment of dividends becomes
possible.211 The question is whether the privatized enterprises can
move systematically in the direction of increasing outsider ownership
and control. The analysis in the sections above suggests cause for concern. When multiple insiders block each other, there is little commitment by insiders to the financial aspects of shareownership. Similarly,
when manager insiders take control and divert assets illegally, outside
investors have little incentive to purchase minority interests.212
Privatization is intended to create wealth that is available for reinvestment in Russia, but the insider structure of corporate ownership
may stimulate capital flight instead. Diversifying risk through portfolio investment in domestic firms is impossible.21 3 Domestic equity investments, to be worthwhile, must be in controlled amounts under the
current system. A system that started with fragmented insider ownership has led to one in which public offerings are impossible, and capital leaves Russia in part because of the unavailability of viable
domestic portfolio investment opportunities to reduce risk through
diversification.
210 For example, consider Baltika Brewing. "Business has boomed thanks to a steady
stream of foreign investment, effective marketing and a good management team." John
Varoli, Baltika Plans to Boost Output 250%, Moscow TIDles, Apr. 22, 1999, 1999 WL
6807006. The firm has been implementing a large capital investment program using its own
reserves as financing, has secured outside credit, and has been one of the few firms in
Russia to pay dividends. One element in the firm's success and credibility on international
financial markets has been firm oversight by a Scandinavian brewing group that holds 70%
of Baltika's shares. See id.
211 See Popov, supra note 55, at 27 (stating that:
In the largest and most attractive Russian companies with high market liquidity, outside investors by now own more shares than workers and managers, and
this pattern is likely to emerge in other companies, whose shares are not yet
traded in the market and which are still controlled by work collectives. While
in the large, but not the largest, privatised Russian companies outsiders owned
in 1996 only 31 % of shares, with 59% of shares belonging to insiders and 9%
to the state, in the 100 largest Russian companies outsiders owned on average
57% of all shares (insiders-22%, the state-21 %.)).
Popov's data highlight this problem. He notes that most successful Russian firms are also
majority-owned by outsiders. See id. at 23. It is unclear, however, which way the causation

runs.
212 See Jack, supra note 14, at 21 ("From now on, ••. new in\·estment \\ill require the
strengthening of the rights of minority shareholders, enhancements to international auditing and accounting standards, and a better tax regime.").
213 A "portfolio investment" in an issuer is an investment in an amount constituting a
sufficiently small percentage of the issuer that it is easily liquidated and causes no control
significance.
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Evolution of Financial Industrial Groups

For a short period, Russia seemed to be moving to a system of
corporate control concentrated in huge, sprawling conglomerates that
came to be known as financial-industrial groups (FIGs), organized
around one of seven chief oligarchs, each with a captive bank, a holding company, and multiple privatized companies as subsidiaries.214
The most significant boon for the FIGs occurred in 1995 with the infamous "shares-for-loans" scheme in which the oligarchs' banks gave
relatively small loans to the government to plug the budget deficit and
in exchange received the rights to run some of the most valuable Russian resource-extracting firms: oil, minerals, timber, and so on.215
When the government predictably did not pay back the loans, the oligarchs conducted rigged auctions through which the collateral on the
loans became controlling shareownership in these firms. 21 6 One oligarch, Vladimir Potanin, in discussing the shares-for-loans program,
noted, "'It was bad.... The prices were cheap. We can stop discussing this. It was bad. But it did solve the problem of having more
efficient owners."'217
According to one estimate, the chief oligarchs, through their
FIGs, were said to control forty percent of Russia's economy.218
These seven "gray cardinals,"219 however, rather than each working to
improve the operations already under his particular control, fought
each other to extend control to additional assets. This led George
Soros to compare Russia to "'a canoe in which seven men are fighting
over a horde of gold [and] are too absorbed by this to recognize they
are heading toward a waterfall.' " 220 The 1998 financial collapse set
the FIGs back, bankrupting several of them, and so it is too early to
see if they really put assets in the hands of more efficient owners. Initial indications, however, are not promising.221
Early in the transition, optimistic commentators argued that the
FIGs roughly would parallel the Japanese experience with keiretsu
214

See Timothy O'Brien, The Shrinking Oligarchs of Russia, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1998,

§ 3, at 1; see also Kranz, supra note 2, at 45 {listing all seven oligarchs).
215 See David Fairlamb, Reining in the Oligarchs, Institutional Investor, Nov. 1998, at
146, 148 (explaining shares-for-loans scheme).
216 See Daniel Treisman, Blaming Russia First: Three Books Examine Russia's Woes,
Foreign Aff., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 146, 151 (book review).
211 O'Brien, supra note 214, § 3, at 1.
218 See Fairlamb, supra note 215, at 147.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 150 (alteration in original).
221 See id. at 154 (noting lack of evidence that new investors would manage oligarchs'
former assets any better).
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and the Korean experience with chaebol.222 Another analogy would
be Oliver Williamson's M-form corporation, in which the head office
substitutes for the capital market's capital allocation and managerial
monitoring functions.223 Given the extreme weakness of Russian capital markets, this substitution seemed a step forward. FIG oligarchs
argued that they were relatively more productive than other sectors of
the economy because their captive banks gave them access to funds at
rates much lower than what was generally available, presumably because of reduced information asymmetries. And, echoing \Vtlliamson,
they argued that "subsidiaries are overseen by group executives at the
center, forcing local managers to pay attention to shareholder value,
something that few other firms in Russia ever consider. "224 According
to Mikhail Khodorkovsky, one of the oligarchs, the FIGs '"are an excellent way of distributing scarce managerial resources throughout the
economy .... Surely, you can see that.' " 225
In practice, the keiretsu and chaebol were not the right analogy;
rather, the FIGs more closely resemble the old Soviet nomenklatura
networks of former Communist and Komsomol members,226 and "'are
to some extent a revival of the old [Soviet] branch ministries."'227
They have not managed the enterprises under their control any better
than firms generally have in the economy. Instead, oligarchs focused
on non pro rata distributions and generally continued to ignore
problems of residual nonmaximization \vithin the firms they controlled. According to one commentator, "'The oligarchs were qualified to run banks only because of their familiarity \vith the corridors of
power .... Uneximbank [one of the FIG banks] never had any interest in improving manufacturing at any of its companies. It just wanted
to channel money through the bank."'228 So far, FIGs seem to have
222 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese
Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 Yale
LJ. 871, 872 (1993} (asserting that Japanese system, featuring investment overlaps between
banks and industry, harmonizes corporate relationships and "facilitate[s] productive efficiency"); Mark D. West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion in Japan and the United
States: Malting Sense of Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 Nw. U. L Rev. 767, 797 (1999) (noting
similarity between Korean chaebol and Japanese keiretsu).
223 See Williamson, supra note 10, at 1225-26 {describing beneficial effects of M-form
enterprise on monitoring and capital allocation).
224 Fairlamb, supra note 215, at 150 (summarizing oligarchs' arguments).
225 Id.
226 See Poul Funder Larsen, 1996: The Year Big Business Became the State, Moscow
Tlllles, Jan. 5, 1997, at 1.
227 Id. (quoting Anders Aslund) (alteration in original).
228 O'Brien, supra note 214, § 3, at 1 (quoting Andrei PiontkO\·"Sb.-y, director, Center for
Strategic Studies, Moscow). The usual routine was for the FIG banks to make loans to
captive borrowers, and once those loans were disbursed, secretly to channel the funds directly into the bankers' private offshore accounts. See id. "It would have been QJ(. if
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exhibited all the corporate governance pathologies we already have
noted; they do not appear to be a step forward.
3.

Some Reform "Thought Experiments"

The critical problems we identify for Russian corporate governance lie at the intersection of uneconomic firm boundaries and control
by competing groups of insiders. Poorly drawn firm boundaries exacerbate the corporate governance problems that arise when, as in Russia, managers are loosely constrained and poorly incentivized.
Control by competing groups of insiders confounds the usual prediction that insider-dominated firms should be good at residual maximization and robs outsiders of their only mechanism for limiting non
pro rata distributions of residuals. For Russia, at least, the firm borders at the time of initial privatization are "water over the dam," and
all that can be hoped for now is greater development of a market for
corporate assets. Voting rights, however, are something that can be
altered by legal fiat, at least in theory. The Russian situation represents a case in which the usual rationales for "one share, one vote" do
not hold. It would be preferable if the voting rights of the competing
corporate insiders could be sterilized in return, perhaps, for an even
greater share of equity. Unless Russia undertakes such a reform, the
best it can hope for is a slow and costly transition to a low-value equilibrium in which outsiders are not available to provide public capital.
A primarily procedural approach to reform, which does not rely
heavily on court enforcement, goes some way toward creating a viable
corporate governance regime.229 However, we are skeptical that such
reforms alone sufficiently would protect outsiders in a way that would
make public equity finance possible-even after firms made the transition to management control. Instead, as just suggested, we believe
that the problems associated with insider blocks require a more subthese loans were made on an arms-length basis. But they weren't . . . . When some banks
made loans they didn't specify interest rates or even when the loans had to be paid back."
Id. (quoting financial analyst requesting anonymity). In short, "the oligarchs' idea of
shareholder value is to asset-strip the companies they control and shunt the money offshore." Fairlamb, supra note 215, at 150-52. Boris Nemtsov, a former deputy prime minister and key reform politician, attributes the failure of reform generally to the role of the
FIGs. He says:
"The reason for this crisis is that after seven years of trying to build a market
economy, we've ended up with oligarchic capitalism .... It is characterized by
the fact that a few FIGs, which, incidentally, work very inefficiently and are
managed by greedy managers whose main aim is to pump money out of their
enterprises and stockpile it abroad, produce the lion's share of GDP."
Id. at 152.
229 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 1932-37 {describing essential features and
advantages of "self-enforcing" model).
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stantive approach that effectively disenfranchises the initial groups of
insiders. For example, Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman sensibly
have suggested neutralizing the voting rights of local governments,
which make up one of the competing blocks of insiders and which are
unlikely to use their rights to maximize shareholder wealth.230 But.
the suggestion to sterilize shares of local government owners applies
with equal force to management and labor blocks. Rules allowing
only outside shareholders to vote also could be used to take control of
the board away from the initial group of insiders, thereby increasing
the value of being an outside shareholder. Insiders with a reduced
capacity to engage in non pro rata distributions could focus more on
the gains to be made from increased share value if residuals were
maximized. Under such a reform, the shares would regain their vote
when transferred to genuinely outside hands.
A grand political deal of insider vote sterilization in return for an
even greater share of equity is obviously impractical in the environment of today's Russia, in part because, again, no one would trust the
results. Policing the independence of outsider shareholders and setting up effective institutions to aggregate their votes is beyond Russian capabilities today.231 Nonetheless, over time, with the evolution
of a somewhat more effective legal system and somewhat greater corporate transparency, insider vote sterilization might represent one
mechanism by which Russia could move toward a modem capitalist
economy, a mechanism that involves less reliance on these institutions
than the bright-line procedural approach that informs the current
Russian code. Such a reform basically would involve taking the logic
of those reforms one step further. Instead of partially disenfranchising insiders by requiring disinterested and supermajority votes for a
wide range of corporate actions, insiders would be disenfranchised entirely. The entire focus of the corporate law system then could be on
policing the single question of which supposedly outside shareholders
are genuinely independent from management. The incentive for a
party to enter the grand political deal would be the potentially large
gains that better-governed corporations could produce.
230

See id. at 1971. Black and Kraakman write:
Because we are skeptical about whether local officials will behave as responsible shareholders, we favor neutralizing government shares in the election of
boards of directors: state bodies should neither nominate nor vote for candidates for the board of directors, although they should retain authority to vote
on potentially company-transforming actions such as mergers and charter
amendments.

Id.
231

See, e.g., id. at 1914.
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Another possibility along these lines-equally implausible now
but perhaps conceivable in the future-would be to create a mechanism that requires payments of dividends when certain benchmarks
are met by a firm. Proposals for minimum dividend payments have
been floated in the American context but could prove even more useful in the Russian one.232 Most importantly, minimum dividend payments by firms with a certain level of assets or revenues could help
people come to view shares as financial instruments rather than just as
levers for control.233
CONCLUSION

A typology of Russian corporate governance can offer useful lessons for corporate governance theory. The rich array of deviant behavior we canvass in Russia helps flesh out a framework of
pathologies that, in a comprehensive way and for the first time, links
corporate governance failures to real economic effects. How is this
analytic tool useful? It helps give more precision to the often vague
notion of corporate governance failures. Scholars write about the
costs of poor corporate governance without telling us the mechanisms
by which loosely constrained and poorly incentivized managers cause
social welfare losses. We suggest that these losses may be inflicted in
differing degrees through one of seven distinct pathologies-five types
of nonmaximization of residuals and two versions of non pro rata distributions. Losses that are not inflicted through one of these seven
mechanisms cannot be attributed properly to something called "poor
corporate governance." More positively, identifying which pathology
predominates may help point to more appropriate corporate governance reforms.
The second focus of this Article-explaining what has caused the
flowering of Russian corporate pathologies-also may prove useful
for corporate governance theory. Not surprisingly, the existing scholarly literature on comparative corporate governance mostly reflects
the experience of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. In
the United States, it is unusual for a corporation to maintain a share
ownership pattern over the long term that involves a majority of
232 See Fox, supra note 68, at 375-402 (describing advantages and drawbacks of rule
requiring dividend payments). Other markets experiencing corporate governance
problems are contemplating minimum dividend payments. See, e.g., Long Hui Ching, Private Firms Should Also Practise Good Governance, New Straits Times (Malaysia), June 7,
1999, 1999 WL 7466714 (reporting suggestion that Malaysian government study possibility
of adopting minimum dividend payments).
233 See Fox, supra note 68, at 375-402 (explaining that minimum dividend payments may
encourage shareholders to see shares as long-term investment opportunities).
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shares owned by insiders and a minority owned by outsiders who
trade their shares publicly. Our understanding of the mechanisms that
constrain management to act in relatively share-value-maximizing
ways-one share, one vote, the hostile takeover threat, share pricebased management compensation schemes, board elections, shareholder approval of certain interested and extraordinary transactions,
ex post court review, the managerial labor market, and other reputational incentives-is built primarily against the U.S. backdrop because
the typical American public corporation forms the paradigm for
theorizing.
We suggest that looking at Russia introduces an analytic focus not
immediately obvious from studying such long-established systems.
Among other things, we see concretely how initial conditions matter
for subsequent corporate governance development. The Russian experience suggests two salient initial conditions, uneconomic firm
boundaries and competing groups of insider owners, that offer avenues for further research. At a minimum, the bargaining failures that
followed privatization provide evidence that counsels skepticism towards the periodic claims of some scholars and activists for including
"stakeholders"-such as labor, the local community, and the local
government itself-in corporate governance. The Russian e>..-perience
reminds us, also quite starkly, of the tradeoff between the agency costs
of management in a publicly held corporation and the disadvantages
of lack of access to public equity finance. This tradeoff appears in the
leveraged buyouts of the late 1980s and the "going private" trend of
the early 1970s: Frrms involved in both movements have tended to go
public again at some later point.
More generally, the Russian experience suggests that we rethink
how close corporations operate. While there is a well-developed jurisprudence of close corporations in the United States, there is only a
modest literature on the economics of such legal relations. Governance of the close corporation traditionally has been viewed by lawyereconomists as a contracting problem among well-informed, well-represented, and motivated individuals in which the best policy advice
that can be given is to have the law not obstruct the deals these individuals reach \vith each other.
The bargaining failures that followed privatization in Russia
could shed light on our own system by focusing attention on the understudied area of losses from fragmented ownership in close corporations and other special corporate governance arrangements such as
those associated \vith start-up companies backed by venture capital.
When competing blocks of insiders exercise their rights so that each
blocks the others, corporate assets may be wasted in a "tragedy of the
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anticommons." 234 If competing blocks of insiders each have incentives to veto share value-maximizing decisions, or if the costs of aggregating and negotiating insider interests to reach such decisions are
sufficiently high, then corporate assets may be wasted in low value
uses. In short, the Russian experience counters recent theoretical and
empirical research that argues that control by multiple large shareholders may improve firm performance.235
The Russian experience of corporate governance is unique: Nowhere else in the world offers such ample and creative corporate governance pathologies, and nowhere else do firms have such strange
boundaries and competing insiders so much control. But the lessons
that Russia teaches are not parochial at all. Russian enterprise fiascoes improve our basic understanding of how corporate governance
works.

234 See Heller, supra note 44, at 622-26 {describing such tragedy in allocation of property rights in post-Communist Russia).
235 See Armando Gomes & Walter Novaes, Multiple Large Shareholders in Corporate
Governance {1999) (draft), available at <http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-gomes/
MLS.pc:if> (arguing that maximally efficient corporate structure consists of multiple large
controlling shareholders together with some noncontrolling shareholders); David Kang,
The Internal Control of Organizations: How Large-Block Ownership by Insiders Leads to
Increased Firm Performance (1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors) (abstract available at <http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID=10576>) (presenting
evidence for superior performance of insider-owned firms in textile industry).

